



U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

Y 4. F 76/1:H 12/12

U.S. Policy Haiti, 103-2 Hearing...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 8, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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(III)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1994

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Washington, DC.***

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman) presiding.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order.

The committee meets today in open session to receive testimony on U.S. policy toward Haiti.

It is a very special pleasure to have with us the Honorable William H. Gray III, our very distinguished and former colleague who recently was named Special Adviser to the President on Haiti.

Obviously, as you know, Mr. Gray, there is a great deal of interest in the Congress and in the country with respect to U.S. policy toward Haiti. Today's hearing will help us better understand where we are headed with respect to that policy and our efforts to restore democracy and return President Aristide to office.

The committee is interested in your testimony on U.S. policy on a political strategy for President Aristide's return; sanctions and enforcement; refugee policy; the role of the U.N. and the OAS; and, of course, U.S. policy concerning possible military intervention.

Mr. Gray, we welcome you back to this committee and we appreciate very much your appearance today. We look forward to your opening statement. Your statement, of course, will be included in the record in full.

Let me turn to Mr. Gilman first. Mr. Gilman.

STATEMENT OF MR. GILMAN

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding this hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti at a very appropriate and critical time. Our Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere has been following events in Haiti closely, but given current circumstances I believe an airing of the issues at full committee level is extremely important.

I also want to welcome our former colleague and good friend, Bill Gray. I think the President's choice of a new emissary to Haiti was a wise one. Mr. Gray has a tough task before him and we wish him success in resolving the current impasse through diplomatic means.

Mr. Chairman, we have a long-term interest in supporting the democratic process in this hemisphere, even when it produces peo-

ple with whom we may disagree philosophically. Haiti should be no exception to that rule.

For this reason, since the September 1991 coup against President Aristide, I have favored a strong diplomatic response to support the return of the constitutional rule to Haiti, along with many of our colleagues.

I believe I reflect the views of many of my Republican colleagues particularly when I say that we should continue to pursue diplomatic and political avenues to resolve this situation.

At the same time, we need to support the development of a democratic center in Haiti, as small and as beleaguered as it is; and we must recognize that any ultimate solution lies with the Haitians themselves. We cannot impose a long-term solution to Haiti's problems from the outside. It is going to have to be done internally.

I want to voice my support for the recently expanded targeted U.N. sanctions and President Balaguer's stated willingness to enforce the embargo from the Dominican Republic is encouraging, though we must ensure the Dominican Army carries out his orders. We welcome the initiatives by Ambassador Gray as he went down to the Dominican Republic to try to tighten up that process.

However, I am concerned that the Haitian people are the ones taking the brunt of the sanctions, not the military or its allies. There are loopholes in the current sanctions policy that penalizes those most in need while not covering certain wealthy families.

For example, our Nation has already frozen the assets and revoked the visas of the 600 military officials and their immediate families. However, to be fully effective, the freeze must be extended to include all prominent families with close ties to the military.

Some of those wealthy families hold virtual monopolies on commercial food imports that are exempted from the sanctions and are profiting enormously from that kind of business. These families, according to public accounts, retain their visas and freely travel back and forth to our country.

If that loophole is not closed, the embargo will reward a small group of wealthy whose support for democracy has been questionable.

The second area of concern is the impact of the ban on all non-commercial flights. While the intent is to penalize sanction-busters, the effect has been to worsen the hardships of the Haitian people.

Two major flight organizations essential to humanitarian assistance programs have been prohibited from flying medical and other supplies to Haiti. Missionary Flights International, MFI, and Agape support the missionary network that provides many essential services to the poor Haitians.

Five of the six hospitals in Haiti are run by American missionaries supported by MFI and the Agape. Since the ban on non-commercial flights, over 45,000 pounds of material, including medical supplies, have not been able to get through to Haiti. As I understand it, no procedures have yet been approved for these missionary flights to be resumed. I would hope that Ambassador Gray is going to be able to take on that problem.

Another victim of the comprehensive sanctions has been the American business community, many of whom initiated invest-

ments in Haiti at the urging of our own country. I have received continuing reports that some American businesses have not been allowed to remove their equipment and assets as they were originally informed. These kind of restrictions only hurt our own citizens and in that situation should also be remedied and we hope Mr. Gray will be able to address that problem.

Meanwhile, our own Nation needs to look for a vehicle that will provide an objective assessment to the situation in Haiti and help shape our future policy there. So I would strongly encourage the administration to implement the recommendation made by Senator Dole and endorsed by the House Republican Policy Committee to create a bipartisan fact-finding commission, similar to the Kissinger Commission for Central America. Such a commission could greatly help to coalesce a bipartisan consensus on Haiti, both for the short and long term.

Finally, I encourage the administration to strongly consider the proposal of our colleague from Florida, Porter Goss, and endorsed by the full House on May 24, to establish a temporary safe haven on the island of Gonave. This option seems all the more attractive given the President's recent reversal on the return of Haitian boat people. This policy change has increased the flow of boat migrants and it is probably safe to say the shipboard and land processing soon to be implemented will further increase their numbers.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing and look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.

We are very pleased to have with us today the distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. Rangel. Mr. Rangel.

STATEMENT OF MR. RANGEL

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for extending, and the committee members, for extending this courtesy to me. I don't know whether to call Mr. Gray Ambassador, reverend, Congressman or chairman, but I know one thing that I never understood the saying that nobody can turn down a President's request until you accepted this mission and now I really understand what they meant.

But realizing, too, that you have never undertaken anything that you have not brought a brilliance and success to, so my prayers are with you. In the past, I don't even know what our policy was. Every time I was beginning to understand it, it shifted, and the high point and being proud to be an American was at Governors Island. And I thought then we pretty much outlined our responsibility to the world, to fragile democracies in this hemisphere, and it was a very no-nonsense approach.

The speedy retreat of the U.S.S. *Harlan County* because of a confrontation with some Haitians with some broomsticks, I will never understand, and why we seem to be able to have more of a compassion and understanding for the military and the wealthy than for the poor who elected a democratic President, I don't know, except I have learned from their experience that the CIA is not always on our side.

But having said that, we really want to work with you because what you have brought to the table is your own credibility. And we

know how sacredly you guard that because it has given America the opportunity to really be the recipients of your brilliance and your leadership and we don't want that to stop here.

And I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to hear where we are now and I look forward that it will be the same policy at least in the next couple of weeks.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you Mr. Rangel. We also have with us Mr. Goss of Florida.

STATEMENT OF MR. GOSS

Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I very much appreciate the courtesy of being allowed to come back to my home committee this morning for this important hearing and I want to congratulate you and Mr. Gilman on holding this hearing. This is an issue that has certainly caught the media's attention for the past several months. It has certainly caught the constituents' attention. I am delighted we are going to have an airing today.

I heard Bill Gray this morning, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Reverend, the honorable, I will say this: I echo Mr. Rangel's comments. He gave us a lot of good news on Fox News this morning. I think it was very upbeat. He also left some areas for questions. I have 16 of those questions prepared and I hope I will have the opportunity to ask them. If not, I will submit them and, I am sure, get an answer in good time because I, too, believe there is nobody more highly regarded or more capable right now to work out a negotiated settlement in Haiti than Bill Gray, and I am absolutely delighted he is in that spot.

Just the amount of energy, and dollar movement that we have seen in the last 2 or 3 weeks since we previously met and since you have been out there doing this job is extremely impressive. Unfortunately, on the down side we have had an increase in the misery level as well. The flights that Ben Gilman referred to being stuck on the ground in Florida are a fact and so is the humanitarian relief which should be going to the critical needs of food, medication, for people whose survival depends on this.

We are not just talking about a policy question. We are talking about actual people living and dying. That relief material, for really undisclosed and unfathomable reasons, just is not getting through. I tend to feel that there is a good deal to be done in this hearing today and I thank you very much the opportunity to be here.

One of the questions that has got to start coming up is the question of costs. We are dealing with five or six different expenditure channels in this operation that we have not previously had by my counting, and I am sure I don't know them all. To be absolutely candid, we have not had good cooperation from the Department of State or the administration in getting the costs so far. And I hope that this hearing will lead to further cooperation in that area.

The other area I had hoped to ask for cooperation on, I know that it was perhaps an oversight, but a letter from Secretary of State to Chairman Hamilton with a copy to Mr. Gilman, or however it worked, discussing my proposal for a safe haven somehow or other did not get copied to me. I think it is only fair that when there is discussion going on of proposals that we are bringing forward on

the floor to resolution, properly handled through the Rules Committee and through the normal processes, that it be appropriate that the authors be included in the discussions, for cooperation sake.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. And the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Torricelli.

STATEMENT OF MR. TORRICELLI

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to welcome our former colleague, Mr. Gray. The President is to be congratulated in the quality of his choice. Even Mr. Gray is to be congratulated on his wisdom in accepting.

It is a pleasure to have him and it makes us all feel considerably better knowing that the policy is in his hands. That is not to say that I do not have great concerns about the policy and the commitments that the United States may soon be accepting. It is not the first time in this century that some have proposed that the problems of our neighboring countries can be solved by the interdiction of American military forces. We have been down that road in Haiti. And we did not come back for over 20 years.

The American military was going to make a difference in Guatemala and Nicaragua and a host of the other countries. The sad legacy is that American military intervention usually only succeeds in compromising national sovereignty and weakening the very institutions that we would strengthen. It is all of our purpose—indeed, it should be our national policy, that President Aristide return to office. He was the democratically elected President of Haiti and he belongs in Port-au-Prince exercising those responsibilities.

It is in my mind, however, a compromise with the very notion of democratic institutions that a foreign military force can ever play a positive role in having a democracy function properly. We have, by our policy, equated democratic institutions with an individual and while indeed President Aristide is the legitimately elected President, I believe that a policy of supporting democracy through economic and diplomatic means, as we have done in Eastern Europe, as we pursued successfully in South Africa, and as we are pursuing now I hope successfully in Cuba is, indeed, the better course.

Finally, I want to add that in addition to my great hesitation about the involvement of American military forces, I hope the administration pursues this policy with some sense of balance. It is our policy to support democracy for the Haitian people. But democracy is not all that we want for the Haitian people.

This is the most desperately poor nation in our hemisphere. Presumably, it is also our policy to support a better quality of life, the eradication of contagious disease, and the elimination of hunger. Indeed, in our vigilance to support a democratically elected President, I hope we do not make the poorest elements of Haitian society our victims.

This is not an unusual choice for the United States. We faced it in South Africa. We face it now in Cuba. But balance must always be remembered lest we destroy the very people that we are attempting to assist with democratic institutions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli. Mr. Gray we are now prepared to hear your statement. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY III, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON HAITI

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted to the committee a full statement that is rather lengthy. I hope it will be entered into the record and I will be allowed to summarize my remarks.

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, so ordered and we appreciate that.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, it is good to be here. As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, I began my career in Congress on this very same committee. Then, as today, I was following my mother's admonition to keep good company. Thus I welcome the opportunity to return to the Foreign Affairs Committee to testify before you today to work with old colleagues and new partners as we confront the difficult issues facing us in Haiti.

CHANGE IN HAITI POLICY

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, on May 8, President Clinton announced a change in our policy on Haiti. Like many of you, he felt the continued intransigence of the military junta in Haiti left us no choice but to step up our efforts to bring down Haiti's dictators and to extend every consideration to those fleeing their oppressive rule. Since the President's announcement, we have achieved significant progress.

Our efforts have been distinguished by three characteristics: They have multilateral participation, they are tough on the de facto regime and its supporters and compassionate toward the regime's victims. To appreciate these characteristics one need only review what has been accomplished since May 8.

SANCTIONS POLICY

Let me talk for a moment about progress in implementing the President's new policy on sanctions.

On May 21, as a consequence of U.S. leadership, United Nations Security Council Resolution 917 imposing stringent new sanctions on Haiti went into effect.

On May 26, the special representative of the Secretaries General of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, Mr. Dante Caputo, and I met with President Balaguer and reached agreement on a plan to seal the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and to send 60 international technical advisors to the Dominican Republic to help in that effort.

On June 3, the representatives of the Friends of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Haiti which include Argentina, Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela, decided, among other things, to consider on a national basis expanded sanctions that would cutoff commercial air flights to and from Haiti and ban international financial transactions with that country. The Friends also expressed their determination to promote the full redeploy-

ment of a strengthened and reconfigured United Nations Mission in Haiti.

REFUGEE POLICY

On the issue of refugees, on May 19, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, and I were pleased to announce agreement on a plan for cooperation between the United Nations and the United States in the processing of Haitian applicants for refugee status, and in locating countries of resettlement for Haitian refugees.

On June 1, the Governments of Jamaica and of the United States announced jointly a plan for shipboard processing of Haitian migrants in Jamaican ports.

On June 3, the Government of the Turks and Caicos Island agreed to the United States' proposals for a land-based processing center on Grand Turk Island, and on multilateral support.

On June 6, Deputy Secretary Talbott and I attended the meeting of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States on Haiti in Belem, Brazil. A strong resolution was enacted which includes a call upon all member States to assist in the resettlement of Haitian refugees, to support measures by the United Nations to strengthen the United Nations police and military mission in Haiti, and to support and reinforce existing and additional sanctions against the military regime and their supporters.

U.S. INTERESTS IN HAITI

While much remains to be done, I believe we have established the basis for a successful conclusion to the Haitian crisis. Allow me to explain why these steps are important and how they fit into the administration's overall strategy.

U.S. interests are at stake in Haiti.

President Clinton is committed to the prompt return of democracy and of President Aristide to Haiti.

Why are we so committed to this task? Why does Haiti matter this much to the United States? How does Haiti differ from other troubled countries around the globe? President Clinton has recently explained our interests quite clearly.

First, Haiti is a close neighbor.

Second, there are approximately 1 million persons of Haitian descent resident in the United States.

Third, several thousand American citizens live in Haiti.

Fourth, we believe drugs are coming to the United States from Haiti.

Fifth, we face the continuous possibility of a massive outflow of Haitian refugees to the United States because of conditions in Haiti.

Finally, Haiti and Cuba are the only two nondemocracies left in our hemisphere. And in Haiti the results of a democratic election that were judged free and fair were overturned by unconstitutional and antidemocratic means.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, let me be as clear as I can. President Clinton has determined that our interests require the restoration of the democratic process in Haiti and the return of the duly elected leadership, President Aristide.

We are embarked on a new path toward this goal. Much has been achieved since President Clinton's announcement on May 8. However, further steps will be taken in the coming days and weeks. No options have been excluded. Democracy in Haiti will prevail. Neither we nor the Haitian people can long wait for this event.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will be glad to take your questions at this time. You have my full statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gray appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

Chairman HAMILTON. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray. Is a military intervention in Haiti imminent?

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, the President has not ruled out any option. Our policy right now is to continue to press with the international community on the sanctions that have only been in place for a little under 4 weeks and to look at options along with the OAS and the Four Friends to strengthen and increase those economic restrictions and target them. It is not imminent at this time that any action is being planned other than those diplomatic actions which have been stated.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS POLICY

Chairman HAMILTON. How much confidence do you have that the sanction policy that you have laid out in your statement will work?

Mr. GRAY. I had a great—

Chairman HAMILTON. How long will it take it to work?

Mr. GRAY. I have confidence, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee, that sanctions can create an environment where people come to their senses. We have seen that throughout the history of world diplomacy. It has happened in many cases; some cases it has not happened. But certainly we have a responsibility to try every arrow in the diplomatic quiver to make sure that the coup leaders step down.

We do not have a time estimate for how long it will take. But I can tell you from my meetings with leaders in the OAS, CARICOM nations, and the Four Friends that they want these economic restrictions to work. They want them to work immediately and that is why they are considering and passing resolutions calling on nations bilaterally to establish further economic restrictions so that we do not allow the coup leaders to stay in place for a longer period of time than they have stayed already.

Chairman HAMILTON. What is the reasonable length of time for us to test sanctions?

Suppose you get them into place and you are reasonably satisfied with the enforcement of the sanctions, what is a reasonable test time for them? Is it 1 month? Is it 6 months? Is it a year?

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I don't think you can put an exact date as to a period of testing or examination. I think what you have to see is what takes place as a result of those economic sanctions. One of the things that we have seen take place, especially since the visit with the Dominican Republic President, is that there has been an attempt to close that

border. That is a very important beginning to seal off the back door to the Haitian coup leaders.

There are still additional things that can be done. I think the world community, our allies in this, will be looking at the impacts and to try to determine whether or not we see some movement on the part of those who are supporting the coup leaders to force them down, to have them reconsider their position. Otherwise, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, there is no specific time period other than a day-to-day, week-to-week look at reality and whether or not these sanctions are changing that reality.

Chairman HAMILTON. In any event, at this point your frame of mind is that the policy is in place? You think the sanctions will work if they are properly implemented and that they will bring about the removal of the military leadership of Haiti and the restoration of Aristide?

Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We hope that these sanctions and the stiffened sanctions that will be coming from individual nations will have that impact, but it will have to be judged day-to-day, week-to-week as to whether or not it is having that impact.

Chairman HAMILTON. Now, I presume you have very solid support in the OAS and in the hemisphere for the sanctions and the enforcement of the sanctions at this point; is that correct?

Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

Chairman HAMILTON. What kind of support do you have at this point in the hemisphere—or worldwide—for military intervention?

Mr. GRAY. Well, I like to use an analogy that comes out of my old congressional district of north Philadelphia, which is an urban row house district. If your house is located next to the house that is on fire, on fire because of a military dictatorship, on fire because of outflow of asylum seekers, then you have one point of view. If your house is across the street, you have another point of view. If your house is in the block, you have a third point of view. If, on the other hand, your house is on the other side of town, you have even another point of view.

When you look at the countries in the Organization of American States, you will find a variety of viewpoints on the subject. Those whose house is adjoined, next to Haiti, are very concerned and don't want to debate how many buckets of water will be thrown on the fire per minute.

Chairman HAMILTON. Are you suggesting—

Mr. GRAY. Those across the street have a different point of view.

Chairman HAMILTON. Are you suggesting, Mr. Gray, that there are a number of the members of the OAS who favor military intervention?

Mr. GRAY. I am suggesting to you that there are some in the OAS who do favor military intervention. There are some who only favor such intervention under certain conditions. And then there are those who say under no circumstances would they favor military intervention. And again, I go back to my analogy, it depends on how close your house is to the fire.

Chairman HAMILTON. The closer they are to Haiti, the more likely they are to support military intervention?

Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

Chairman HAMILTON. Now, the papers are reporting this morning about the formation of a 3,000 soldier task force and I want to get clear in my mind just what we are doing there. Under what circumstances does that task force move into Haiti?

Does that come about as a result of U.S. military intervention and then we hand off responsibilities to the task force or does that task force go into Haiti only if the military steps aside? Tell me how that task force gets into Haiti.

Mr. GRAY. I am not familiar, Mr. Chairman, with the article that you are commenting on, but I assume it is referencing UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, which is presently in the process of being reconfigured, reconstituted and strengthened. The Five Friends and the OAS and President Aristide have all come to agreement that the original United Nations mission envisioned in the Governors Island accord is insufficient. That Governors Island accord viewed a situation where the United Nations mission in Haiti would go in with the cooperation of the coup leaders who would have stepped down voluntarily in accordance with that accord.

Since that has not occurred, it is clear that there needs to be a broader mandate and a significantly different kind of UNMIH. That is what is being discussed now in OAS and among the Five Friends. The United Nations will make a decision this month on that issue because the mandate runs out. With regard to your question—

Chairman HAMILTON. That task force would be ready to go into Haiti when the military steps aside; is that right?

Mr. GRAY. That task force has as its mission—UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, has as its mission the role of going into Haiti the moment the coup leaders step down.

FUNCTIONS OF UNMIH

Chairman HAMILTON. And their task at this point becomes what?

Mr. GRAY. Their task at this point becomes—

Chairman HAMILTON. Let me run through some functions for you to see if we are thinking along the same lines. They would have the responsibility of disarming the military; reinstating Aristide; preventing violence; securing the area; creating a civilian police; keeping order; providing civil order; getting economic assistance there and getting it distributed. Are those the kind of functions they would be taking on?

Mr. GRAY. I would say generally you have described essentially what the United Nations Mission in Haiti is to do. It should be ready to deploy once the current military leadership in Haiti has departed. We envision this as a permissive operation. The mission should have a mandate and a composition, however, which would permit it to deal with such challenges as it is likely to encounter in the course of its deployment.

We believe that in addition to responsibilities for training and professionalization of the army and police, UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, should also be given the mandate and the capability to support the democratic Government of Haiti in providing security to the international presence and to senior Haitian Government personnel and key installations and helping assure basic civil order.

U.S. POLICY ON BROADENING HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

Chairman HAMILTON. Finally, is it U.S. policy today to encourage President Aristide to broaden his political base?

Mr. GRAY. It is U.S. policy to support the return of democracy, the duly elected leader of that nation, which is President Aristide, and I think after my conversations with President Aristide, that he is well aware of the political realities and needs very little prompting from us to understand those needs of base broadening and using a message of reconciliation.

Chairman HAMILTON. So it is our policy, then, to encourage President Aristide to broaden his political base?

Mr. GRAY. I believe my answer, Mr. Chairman, is that President Aristide already recognizes his own political needs. In fact, at the Belem conference on Monday, he gave a very pointed address where he talked about reconciliation, and his proposal, politically and economically which included elements of base broadening.

Chairman HAMILTON. So then you would expect him, then, to work with, for example, the Haitian parliamentarians who are also elected and with other political forces in the country?

Mr. GRAY. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think that he clearly understands his responsibilities and the constitution of his country under which he was elected and I think if you look at his speech in Belem, this past Monday, it is very clear that he has a very pointed plan for political reconciliation, as well as economic reconciliation.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gray, the Netherlands has agreed to the resettlement of five Haitians who qualify for asylum. Does the decision of Canada and Venezuela to take political refugees consist of similar marginal numbers? Have other countries said they will take refugees, and if so, how many are they willing to accept?

Mr. GRAY. We don't have the exact number Mr. Gilman, that have been approved by individual nations. We do know that while we are in conversation with these nations, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has agreed to take the leadership on this issue, and we know that there are several countries that have agreed to resettle Haitian refugees who are granted political asylum through a process of fair hearings.

Secondly, there are a number of countries who have said they will consider it, have not responded. So I cannot at this time, Congressman, give you an exact number for each country other than when that country makes that announcement.

Mr. GILMAN. Are you in contact with some of those nations?

Mr. GRAY. Yes. We are in contact with a long list of nations seeking to know what they will do on resettlement, but that issue is being led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as the partner that has come on board in this issue recognizing the international implications of the refugee problem.

IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON HAITIAN BUSINESS ELITE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Gray, most Haitian businessmen indicate that they are determined to ride out the sanctions. In your opinion, are current international efforts eroding the support of the business community and to what extent are the prominent families with close ties to the military, whose assets have not been frozen and whose visas have not been revoked, buffering the effects of the sanctions under the military?

Mr. GRAY. It is my view, Congressman, that the statements that you are hearing from business elite who have been supporters of the coup leaders are not real indications of what is happening. Our intelligence tells us that there are many who are beginning to feel already after only 3 weeks the bite of these sanctions. And at the same time when you look at the statement coming from the Five Friends calling for additional prohibitions on commercial airline traffic and financial transactions between Haiti and other countries, we are being told that there is an increasing awareness that this business elite that has supported the coup leaders will not be able to sit back and wait 6, 8, months or 1 year before they feel the pain. It will be fairly immediate.

There are also discussions going on in various governments about broadening the list of those who are going to be denied visas. Right now those who are denied visas are the coup leaders, the front government that was put in place and their relatives, but many nations are looking at the possibilities of broadening that as they look to find who are the coup leaders' supporters.

POST-INTERVENTION POLICY

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Gray, there has been a lot of talk about intervention—and in the event that becomes a final option and we do intervene—what would be your assessment of the follow-up mission and exit policy? Have you looked at that aspect?

Mr. GRAY. Well, there has not been, from my point of view, any strategy discussions with regard to intervention by the United States. Our policy is to work multilaterally with the OAS, with the United Nations, as we have done throughout this process, to ensure that we are acting with the support of others in the region and in the world community. Let me just simply say that the issue of strategies for going in, who goes in under what circumstances, those discussions have not occurred. The President has just made it very, very clear that he has not ruled out any option whatsoever.

EXPECTED DURATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Mr. GILMAN. One last question.

The press today reported that there is some talk of a multi-national peacekeeping force. If we were to engage in that effort, and I assume we would make up a good portion of that peacekeep-

ing role, what sort of length or period would it necessitate for an intervention of that nature?

Mr. GRAY. The UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, which is being reformed and will be by the United Nations this month, and which has found support from President Aristide, from the Five Friends and also from the OAS, does not give a specific time limit for it to be there. Under the old Governors Island agreement, it was to be there for 6 months.

Clearly, if the coup leaders step down in adversarial circumstances, no matter how they came down, UNMIH's role would have to be reevaluated in terms of the duration of the expanded mandate.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Torricelli.

PRECEDENT SET BY INTERVENTION

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that my questions and comments are directed toward the possibility of an American-armed incursion into Haiti, not in us playing a responsible role in a multilateral force after the dictatorship has ended. Such a role for the United States would be appropriate based on historic precedence, and I think a source of pride for every American.

I am obviously not as convinced about the possibility of an American-armed invasion of Haiti. Not because I don't share every members' desire to see the Haitian military removed, because I have a number of questions of precedent and the large impact that it might have. Indeed, it is my own belief that American foreign policy is best directed when it is based on doctrine and not anecdotally applied. My concern would be that if indeed we are to involve ourselves in Haiti in an armed incursion, is the United States establishing that in each democracy in the hemisphere, if it were to be interrupted by the armed forces of that nation, we would use the American Armed Forces to restore the democratic-elected governments?

In the last year alone, there has been a considerable and continuing threat of the Venezuelan Armed Forces interrupting democratic government. Indeed, in the year preceding in Guatemala and in Peru, such constitutional interruptions actually occurred.

I wonder, Mr. Gray, whether you or the administration is concerned about the precedent being established and whether you are prepared to say that this possibility arises now only with Haiti or indeed there is some new doctrine in the making?

INTERVENTION DECIDED ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS

Mr. GRAY. I would say, Congressman, that the President has given reasons which I stated today. If you look at those reasons that he has articulated, they are unique reasons that focus upon Haiti. They would not necessarily apply throughout the region.

Certainly a threat to democracy anywhere is a threat to democracy everywhere. The question really becomes what can we do about it and what is the best way of going about doing it?

In places where we have the opportunity to do something about it, providing leadership in making the change and having the ability to do it become questions that are central to determining what the policy ought to be, and also with that working within the framework of the community of nations. This policy has attempted to be guided by the thoughts, decisions of the community, the broader community and also very specifically the Western Hemispheric community, the OAS, in making determinations as to what we can and cannot do. But when I look at the question of military intervention, one has to look at each situation, look at what our interests are in that, and then ask the question not only of those things, but also whether or not you can make a difference in intervention and whether or not there will be community support for that intervention.

IMPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION IN HAITI

Mr. TORRICELLI. It would, however, be extraordinarily naive for the administration to believe it can militarily intervene in Haiti and not have an enormous impact or raise the specter in a variety of other nations that we might pursue exactly the same policy. Indeed, Venezuela is infinitely more important to the United States economically than Haiti. There are a variety of nations in Central America that have as many or more citizens residing in the United States than Haiti.

It is unclear to me where this line would be drawn. What is I think is a real threat is that there is in the making an American corollary of a Brezhnev doctrine. In 1968 Leonid Brezhnev declared that socialism was irreversible in the world.

Are we now to declare that any state in the Western Hemisphere that has become democratic and chosen a democratic leader will not defend that choice without the threat of American-armed intervention to reverse it? Indeed, it is my belief that historically the United States has used all of its economic and diplomatic means, even on occasion lending training and military support to those who wanted to defend or establish their own democracies. But I am unaware of any precedent in this hemisphere where the United States went beyond those means to actually use our own forces to defend and to help establish democratic institutions in another nation, and I appreciate your response to that.

THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE INTERVENTION

Mr. GRAY. Again, Congressman, I think you raise a very important point.

Again, I would respond by saying obviously the United States, as the world's perhaps only superpower at this time, has a moral stake in promoting democracy and human rights throughout the world. At the same time, our capacity to influence events varies from place to place. We may not be able to right every wrong. We may not be able to be everywhere every time.

But there is not a valid argument against taking actions in places where our interests are heavily engaged and at times where and when we have the ability to do so. Indeed, there are times when the ability to influence events in the right direction gives us

the responsibility to do so. There are some places where we may not be able to influence events in the right direction.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray—

Mr. GRAY. But in some places there are. So this is, in my estimation, one of the places where we are working multilaterally with the CARICOM nations, the OAS community, and the U.N. having the capacity to influence events in the right direction. So thus, you have to look at it I believe in that context and thus if you said to me what would happen in Venezuela if there was a coup d'état, a dictatorship, again, I would pose to you the same kind of questions.

LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERVENTION

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for a final point?

Chairman HAMILTON. Certainly.

Mr. TORRICELLI. The last time this Congress was asked to consider the question of American military intervention abroad in the Persian Gulf, we were very careful to establish the legal foundation. It was our hope that in this new world when nations use force of arms, they would do so only after having a clear foundation in international law.

I wonder if you could for us first establish in either the U.N. charter or the OAS where there would be a legal foundation for a American military intervention in Haiti. Whether, indeed, it rises to the threshold created in the U.N. charter of there being a serious threat to international peace and security, that being the only instance that I know in the U.N. charter that would permit such an operation.

And second, I wonder if you would also address to me the legal point that if, indeed, U.S. military forces were to intervene in Haiti and President Aristide were returned to the Presidency, which he admittedly deserves, does President Aristide then retain under his constitution the legal right to decide when those forces leave, how they would operate, and whether they would be there and their operations would be at his discretion and direction since almost certainly under the constitution of Haiti that would remain his legal prerogative.

DECISION ON INTERVENTION RESTS WITH PRESIDENT

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, with regard to the first issue, I would advise the President of the United States that even though we are participants in the U.N. and the OAS, and we work very closely with them and we are trying to develop multilateral initiatives diplomatically to solve this crisis, that ultimately the decision to use a military option must be made by the President of the United States, not by an international body for the President of the United States. And he would have to determine what our interests were. So from a legal point of view the ultimate decision of whether or not to use the military option would be up to the President of the United States of America based upon what he believes are the best interests of the United States.

AUTHORITY OVER PEACEKEEPING MISSION

With regard to the second issue which is if there was, and I would like to use two possible scenarios, one, the coup leaders left voluntarily or involuntarily under any one of those circumstances, you do have a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, how long that peace mission would be in Haiti would be determined by the mandate that is given by the United Nations.

Could President Aristide order that peacekeeping mission to leave and under what circumstances? I do not know all of the legal ramifications of that, but I can tell you based on the speech that I heard from President Aristide in Belem, as well as his comments that I heard printed in the news media and his comments to me, he is supportive of a peacekeeping force that would maintain an increased mandate as we have talked about earlier in these hearings and so I would be very surprised if there ended up being any conflict on that issue.

But, of course, the issue of democracy, the people of Haiti, changing their constitution, having a different vote on the Parliament, having a different vote. That is what democracy is about. That is what we are fighting for, so I cannot predict what might happen in the Parliament of Haiti 8 or 10 months from now.

What we are fighting for with the world community in terms of sanctions is to allow that democracy to grow so that they can have that choice, whether or not we may agree with all of its ramifications.

Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair will recognize Mr. Ballenger, but before that, I understand Mr. Rangel has an important meeting at the Ways and Means Committee, so I will recognize Mr. Rangel first.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF EMBARGO

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I really appreciate this courtesy you've extended.

I just have one question before I leave. Ambassador, could you share with me why you have any optimism at all that the embargo will be successful?

I recognize that you cutoff the general's credit cards in Miami. I know that he will no longer be able to dance and drink champagne in Miami. I understand that the assets of the very wealthy we may try to seize but we do have a problem right now in doing that. And it is just my opinion that when the embargo is finally analyzed, the people that are going to have the food, the money from drug trafficking, the money from shaking down the wealthy and the guns are the military.

I just cannot see, no matter how severe the sanctions get, that the military will leave voluntarily. And so if you have any suggestion that you can allow me to adopt as to why they would leave based on the sanctions, I wish, Ambassador, you would share it with me.

Mr. GRAY. I think that is an excellent question by the Congressman from New York and the answer that I give when people ask me that is that even though there have been a series of sanctions over the last couple of years, they really have not been very signifi-

cant. They were voluntary under the OAS and it was just arms and oil. You really have not had a real set of sanctions with teeth in them until those that took effect on May 21.

And I don't believe that in 3 weeks or 3½ weeks we ought to discount their potential effect. Particularly when there is a possibility, as we have seen from the Four Friends and the OAS, that new sanctions may be coming forward that will target the wealthy supporters of the military and also the upper echelons that have been backing the coup leadership.

I believe that we must try these, we must try every possible thing to bring that pressure which will create a situation where the supporters of the coup leaders go to General Cedras, to General Biambry, to Lieutenant Colonel Francois, and say you must leave. We do not want this country totally wrecked. We are talking about the coup leaders. We are not talking about the entire military leaving.

Mr. RANGEL. The coup leaders would leave because it is the right thing to do?

Mr. GRAY. They would leave, I believe, because it suddenly would no longer be in their interests to stay.

Mr. RANGEL. They would be moved because of the pain that the Haitians are suffering?

Mr. GRAY. No, the pain that they will suffer, the pain that they are suffering.

Mr. RANGEL. That is my only point. My only point is what pain? What inconvenience will they suffer?

Mr. GRAY. Well, Congressman, if you isolate them through inability to travel, if you also take away their liquidity of their assets, and as you well know—

Mr. RANGEL. If they haven't pulled the money out yet, then they are dumber than I thought they were.

Mr. GRAY. As you know, Congressman, from the Ways and Means experience, world trade in the business community is not necessarily done in Haitian currency but in other currency and thus if other nations join with you in not only freezing the coup leaders' assets but stopping third party transfers, also affecting the liquidity of the business classes, then you have a tough choice. No, I don't expect them out of the goodness of their hearts to step down. They have signed agreements at Governors Island and then refused to step down.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXAMPLE

I agree with you in that assessment but I do believe that with enough economic pressure, finely tuned and targeted, there is a possibility that forces inside of Haiti will force them down. Let me give an example that you played a very important role in. Back in the 1980's, people said that there was no possibility, and I admit that comparisons are always dangerous and situations are not the same, but people said that under no circumstances would sanctions have any impact on a first world country in Africa that was industrialized, South Africa.

But I also remember, Congressman, when you and a couple of other members through Ways and Means Committee, passed legislation affecting the International Monetary Fund credit, tax re-

bates for South Africa. We saw the South African economy take a dip of 40 to 50 percent in 1 week and I do believe that sanctions had a role in creating an environment where leadership like Mr. de Klerk could emerge from P.W. Botha, supported by the business community who decided that it was not in their interests to lose everything. My viewpoint is that if we finely tune these sanctions, if we target them, if we ratchet them up immediately, and not allow people to sit there, the wealthy for 6 months to a year, that you may see the same kind of process take place where the truly wealthy who have been the supporters of this coup will come forward and say I am not prepared to lose everything, it is time for the coup leaders to go. I think we have got to try that and I think we have got to watch it carefully week-to-week to determine whether there is an effect before looking at other options.

Mr. RANGEL. You have my support and my prayers. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.

Mr. Ballenger.

IMPACT OF EMBARGO ON HUMANITARIAN AID FLIGHTS

Mr. BALLenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gray, because my wife some years ago got together with Liddy Dole and tried to help build a hospital in Haiti; she developed a very strong friendship with Dr. David McKneeler who runs the hospital and he has been calling us on a regular basis describing the difficulties that he has had. The May 6 resolution, indicating that they were going to cutoff all commercial flights, has created a situation where everything is getting terribly low in his hospital. He was getting no medical supplies, nothing. On May 25, you said that the administration would be addressing this loophole and I know that the airline, Agape Airline, has got 45,000 pounds of medical supplies in Florida ready to go at any time, but because of the technicalities or paperwork, it doesn't seem to be able to move. I just wonder if you could give us an answer about what is going on about freeing the humanitarian airlines which could get supplies into Haiti.

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, we share that concern. As you know, the Resolution 917 in the U.N. said everything but commercial airlines, and thus one of the problems that arose out of those sanctions is the fact that many humanitarian flights are caught up in a process where they have to apply for individual clearance for each flight. That process is very lengthy and we share your concerns that there needs to be something done to speed up the possibility of humanitarian aid getting in.

The United Nations Security Council Haiti Sanctions Committee has not yet adopted guidelines for a case-by-case review and approval of such flights. However, the United States has adopted interim procedures for reviewing and seeking approval of humanitarian flights in accordance with U.N. requirements.

We were prepared to process expeditiously that request with U.N. requirements for humanitarian flights to Haiti and we are working with humanitarian agencies and charter carriers providing service to Haiti to ensure that they understand these requirements and to obtain for them the specific information we need to obtain

U.N. approval for these flights. In a word, we are trying to short-circuit the red tape and come up with a procedure so that these worthy humanitarian flights are not delayed for weeks because they have to go through various channels.

On Monday we submitted two requests on behalf of two different humanitarian flight organizations to the U.N. Sanctions Committee. We will continue to work closely with these organizations to prepare requests which can move through the process expeditiously. And so there is a problem, I agree with you. We are trying to work with the U.N. so that we can come up with an expedited procedure so that these worthy efforts can be continued, food, medicine, those groups working and having a long-time history.

URGING EXPEDITED APPROVAL FOR HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me just say, it now has been 2 weeks since something was going to be done and I understand from my co-worker right next to me here, Mr. Goss, that these airlines have been feeding 1 million people in Haiti with their supplies. It appears to me that since we seem to be the leader and the decisionmaker taking charge of what is going on in Haiti, that to sit back and wait for some red tape from the United Nations just doesn't float—can we not make things move in the United Nations to help mankind?

Mr. GRAY. Yes, we can, Mr. Congressman, and we are going to do that. We are trying to work out an expedited procedure for U.S. charter flights that are carrying food and medicine. Let me also agree with you, we have had ongoing humanitarian efforts in there for some time and those efforts are actually going to be expanded so that the masses do not suffer. We are increasing our feeding programs and our care programs significantly now and in the future.

So I would say to you, Congressman, we are working with the U.N. right now to get through that red tape. It was a problem that arose and we are trying to solve it so that we can get those humanitarian flights in right away.

Mr. BALLENGER. It seems to me that the United Nations has asked us to do various and sundry wonderful things in humanitarian aid for the last couple of years and we follow through every time. It seems pathetic to say that it takes 2 weeks or 3 weeks to figure things out. I mean people could starve to death in 2 weeks or 3 weeks. It seems if the United Nations can't come around with the paperwork, we could. I wish you luck in your efforts there.

Mr. GRAY. Let me just say, Congressman, we already have about 1 million people that we feed right now in Haiti. We are negotiating an increase in the authorized levels to 300,000 more Haitians, bringing our authorized total to 1.34 million beneficiaries. So those who are saying that we are not interested in the poor, the children, the hungry, that is not the case.

But we do recognize that these sanctions have caused problems which have to be addressed individually and be resolved and when we have systems that keep an airplane or food or medicine in storage, it is important, we have got to resolve that. You are absolutely right we are committed to doing that with the United Nations, but we cannot have a sanctions policy that simply says someone can show up and says I have humanitarian aid, I have medicine, let me

bring it in. There has to be a procedure, there has to be, as you point out, a shortened procedure so that these groups that have been there for a good time with a proven track record have the ability to cut through the tape.

Mr. BALLENGER. It seems the answer is: using American taxpayers' money, we can get it through, but people want to voluntarily give, we can't get it through.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Johnston.

LACK OF DEBATE PRIOR TO PREVIOUS INTERVENTIONS

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador for coming today. Just an observation first and then two quick questions.

For precedence in Central and South America, there was never any debate before we invaded Panama. There was never any debate before we invaded Grenada. There was never any debate before we bombed Libya.

There were 500,000 troops in Saudi Arabia before we had any debate whatsoever on Kuwait. There were 20,000 troops in Somalia before we ever had any debate. So there is a lot of precedent. For my friend from New Jersey, there is another instance for the United Nations to invade, and that is genocide. That has not been the occurrence here, but there is the occurrence in Rwanda.

Two questions. The U.S. drug—

Mr. TORRICELLI. Since the gentleman invoked my name, I assume he wouldn't mind yielding. My point was whether there was a precedence that the U.S. Government would invade another country to reinstitute a democratic government.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I reclaim my time.

Mr. TORRICELLI. The gentleman has still not cited the precedent.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I invoked your name on the United Nations question, not on your position on Central and South America.

DRUGS IN HAITI

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration seems to be in contact with certain colonels in Cedras' Army. They are in communications back and forth. Do you know about it? And if it is continuing, why has it not been terminated?

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, the answer that I give you, the situation with regard to drugs in Haiti, what type of traffic it is, the size of that traffic, who are involved, that traffic is currently under review. I have not had access to that information, but we expect when a review is completed that the answer to those questions will be available. Unfortunately, that is the only answer that I can give to you at this time, is that the drug trafficking, the size, who is involved, the extent is under review by our appropriate department.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I would like to follow up on that.

Mr. GRAY. I would be glad to come to you as soon as a review is completed by the appropriate agency and that information is shared. We certainly will share it with you, Congressman.

IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SOUTH FLORIDA

Mr. JOHNSTON. Congressman Hastings and I are both from south Florida, as you well know. And in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach County we have approximately 100,000 Haitians, 750,000 Cubans in the last three decades, 50,000 Guatemalans, 50,000 Nicaraguans. We are at a point of total absorption now and can't take too many more. Jamaica has agreed to process some of the Haitians.

The ranking member mentioned Holland, the Netherlands taking in five or something like that. Is there any very strong effort on behalf of your special envoy in charge to find other countries or other areas of the United States, like they did with the Vietnamese boat people, to absorb these immigrants, legal or illegal, coming in from the Caribbean basin?

Mr. GRAY. My charge, Congressman, has been to help develop a policy that deals not only with the deeper political structural problems caused by the coup but also deals with the refugee situation. What I have tried to say in my testimony is that we have made some significant progress.

First, it is not simply the United States involved in it any longer; it is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Second, we have gotten two countries involved with us in processing.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO REFUGEE PROBLEM

Third, we are in the process of working with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in looking at countries for resettlement. There are some who have said that they would. There are others from whom we are waiting to hear.

Other than those that you have read about in the newspaper, we are not at liberty to talk about the numbers but, yes, we are working on an international approach to the refugee problem both in processing and in resettlement and the reason, Congressman, is because the refugee problem is not simply a problem of south Florida or the United States. It is a hemispheric problem. It is a problem that is created by the lack of democracy and the coup leadership that is there violating human rights, and so therefore we have got to approach that problem that way and what we have tried to do in the last 3 weeks, Congressman, is do just that. I think we are making progress on it. And we are seeking other nations to be involved in the resettlement.

I am not, however, involved in talking to states or cities, in the United States with regard to resettlement. We are talking to other nations to be a part of an international strategy just as we are trying to develop international strategies diplomatically through sanctions and pressure against this regime.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Just in closing, to use your analogy, a house that is burning down is next door to Florida.

Thank you, Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. I understand that. I didn't use Florida but Florida would be a place just like the Bahamas, just like the Turks and Caicos, just like Barbados and just like Jamaica so it does depend

on where you sit as to how you analyze the fire and how rapidly you want to move in terms of putting it out.

Chairman HAMILTON. My understanding that Mr. Hyde is willing to have Mr. Goss precede him. Mr. Goss, we are delighted to have you back to the committee and we welcome you.

MEDIA REPORTS OF UNILATERAL INTERVENTION

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the courtesy and so I ask that my questions be included in the record because I know I am not going to get through all of them.

Chairman HAMILTON. Yes, indeed. We will be submitting some additional questions to you, Mr. Gray. We will certainly include Mr. Goss' questions.¹

Mr. GOSS. Thank you sir.

Mr. Gray, I started off by saying I had some questions after listening to you on Fox this morning. I still have even more now and that is a good sign that this has been a good use of time.

Media reports have suggested, in response to your comment that our mission is to bring down Haiti's dictators, that a multinational peacekeeping force will not be put in place if U.S. military intervention is used to remove Cedras, et al. Is this true and if—

Mr. GRAY. No.

Mr. GOSS. That is not true?

Mr. GRAY. No.

Mr. GOSS. So the media reports are incorrect?

Mr. GRAY. The report I believe that you read out of one particular newspaper—

Mr. GOSS. It was the Post, wasn't it?

Mr. GRAY [continuing]. Is not accurate, that suggests that UNMIH will not be reconfigured if there is a military intervention. I believe that is the statement. The answer is no.

Mr. GOSS. This statement says that only if Haiti military rulers give up power peaceably. I believe "peaceably" is the operative word and you are saying that is incorrect.

Mr. GRAY. That is incorrect.

Mr. GOSS. So therefore that doesn't effectively rule out unilateral U.S. military intervention as far as the OAS and U.N. are concerned.

Mr. GRAY. The U.S. Government, the President has said that all options are on the table—

Mr. GOSS. I wasn't speaking to what the President said. I was speaking to what the U.N./OAS motion is and I understood the motion they took in Brazil yesterday, in fact, did rule out unilateral U.S. intervention as a precursor to the peacekeeping accords going into effect from Governors Island.

Mr. GRAY. No, that is not correct.

Mr. GOSS. Thank you. This paper was wrong.

Mr. GRAY. In fact, that was not what the OAS statement out of Belém said at all.

Mr. GOSS. Good. If that situation changes, we would like to know. It is very important. As you know, Congress has expressed

¹ All questions submitted for the record and responses thereto appear in the appendix.

an opinion on that. As my colleague from Florida has suggested, we are a house next door, but as far as I know nobody in Florida is calling for invasion, or very few.

COMPOSITION OF PROSPECTIVE U.N. MISSION

Second question, in the event that the process which—I said very few. I qualified that when I saw your hand go up, Alcee.

In the event that there was success and Cedras left and things came to pass and Aristide returned with this peacekeeping force, who would be providing the security of the country? Not the national security but the stability? The domestic stability and further to that, who would be providing for Aristide's personal safety?

Mr. GRAY. The United Nations Mission in Haiti.

Mr. GOSS. Would that include U.S. military personnel?

Mr. GRAY. We expect that if there is a United Nations mission in Haiti, that there would be some U.S. participation.

Mr. GOSS. So it would be possible to foresee that we would have U.S. military personnel providing personal security for President Aristide in Haiti?

Mr. GRAY. There is a possibility that U.S. troops will be part of the United Nations Mission in Haiti for peacekeeping purposes. What role they would serve such as specific security for President Aristide is yet to be determined. Each country's contribution will be determined based on what that country's specialties are.

There are some countries that would provide, Congressman, law enforcement because they have French-speaking people who could provide for civil law enforcement in the streets. There will be others that will provide for logistical support, transporting of goods and services. There will be others that will be involved in retraining the military. So it is not a correct assumption to say that because the United States participates in UNMIH we will be providing personal security for President Aristide.

COST OF U.N. MISSION

Mr. Goss. Right. But we can't rule it out. Now, the things you have outlined sound to me very expensive. I do want to get to the cost factor.

I was just going through some of the things. We have got costs involved in the administration's policy of enforcing sanctions. We know there are a great number of ships running around down there. Providing reimbursement to Jamaica and Turks and Caicos, and we don't know all the deals. We read millions of dollars for the use of their premises or facilities or whatever of running processing centers and cruise ships cost. The cost of sustaining Aristide's government in exile in D.C. and of course humanitarian relief efforts that you spoke to in response to Mr. Ballenger's questions.

These are just some of the costs. I don't know what they are, but they are beginning to mount up, and I think a time is going to come very shortly where we would like to have not only an estimate of what the cost is today, but what we can expect in the reasonable future. And, under the assumption that the policy prevails, how much is it going to cost the United States of America taxpayers to provide our share of whatever the peacekeeping mission is going to be under the Governor's Island accord.

Mr. GRAY. Those are very good questions, Congressman, and the response that I have is that we are calculating the costs for the processing centers because they haven't gone on line yet. We are also concluding arrangements with regional governments with regard to UNMIH, that has to be a reconstituted, strengthened, new mandate by the U.N. And the size of the force, its mandate, will also help to determine its costs.

And we will be consulting with Congress as soon as we can develop a reasonable and reliable cost.

The costs of President Aristide which you mentioned are being borne by Haitian funds, not by the U.S. taxpayer.

CONTACTS WITH COUP LEADERS

Mr. GOSS. May I ask a follow-up on that last question? Have there been any direct or indirect negotiations with General Cedras, inducements or threats offered to excuse himself from his present position that you can talk about in this hearing?

Mr. GRAY. I am not able, Congressman, to talk about those hypotheticals at this point. We are just committed to seeing that the coup leaders leave. There have been negotiations already on at least two occasions where those coup leaders came to agreements. Aristide and the democratic forces agreed and then it was the coup leader who reneged on those agreements, broke those agreements, and that is why the OAS and the United Nations and all of our allies in the hemisphere are united in condemning the coup leadership and asking for their removal.

Mr. GOSS. It is good, and I think that there is opportunity for negotiated settlement, and I thank you.

REQUEST FOR COST ESTIMATES

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goss, I think you raise a good point with respect to the costs. And, Mr. Gray, we will ask you to furnish as soon as you can cost estimates of just how much Haiti is costing everyone.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, we will provide those costs as soon as we have them because many of the items I mentioned have not actually gone into implementation and the cost estimates are changing.

Chairman HAMILTON. OK. Mr. Hastings and then Mr. Hyde. Mr. Hastings.

HISTORY OF CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO INTERVENTION

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, because of time constraints, we were unable to get all opening statements. With your permission, I would like unanimous consent to include the opening statement I would have made in the record.

Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hastings appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Gray. Following and invoking my colleague, Mr. Goss talked about Floridians and military intervention, their views

with reference to that. Senator Graham also feels that we have reached a stage where military intervention at least ought to remain an option and a credible threat should be maintained.

I was very interested in my colleague's, Mr. Torricelli, the chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, comments and I use the opportunity not so much to ask the question but to say to you that when we think in terms of the reasons for U.S. intervention in foreign crises, the United States has since the inception of the Union used our armed forces abroad 234 times in situations of conflict or potential conflict. There is no formula into which civilian and military planners plug numbers to see if we should engage and there is no concrete theorem that remains constant and true. Every instance has been decided individually. The same will likely be maintained with reference to Haiti in the event that option is used.

My colleague, Mr. Johnston, cited Panama and Grenada and the Persian Gulf. He left out Nicaragua where there also was surreptitious involvement of the United States and lots of precedents exist for our having been involved in various engagements in the Western Hemisphere.

CONSIDERING FUTURE COMMONWEALTH STATUS FOR HAITI

I want to ask a question. I always want to do something that I think is positive. Mr. Gray, because of you, I am constrained to hold my fire on the Clinton administration because I have great confidence that you, as well as all of us, are about the business of trying to resolve the problem of Haiti. But I would look beyond the resolution to what must transpire.

Somewhere along the line there has to be a method whereby we may be able to engage all forces of opposition in Haiti. The adversaries need to come to some understanding. I put on the table a little more controversy. It might be wise for the United States to look at Puerto Rico and how it came to commonwealth status and to consider their identity, that Haiti might be in a position where all forces might very well want to look at that as a possibility.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Hyde.

THE FOUR FRIENDS AND THE MILITARY OPTION

Mr. HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I congratulate President Clinton on selecting Bill Gray for this very delicate job, and I am glad that you are still available to be dragooned into service when your country needs you when this is such an issue. So I am very happy that you are in place.

I note that the administration is very reluctant to lift the embargo on Bosnia because of the other members of the U.N. who have an interest in that region. I am speaking of Great Britain and France and until they are willing, despite the fact that our President said he is willing, we are not going to do it unilaterally or at least that is what my understanding of present policy is. So I would ask if in Haiti the Four Friends—Canada, France, ourselves and Venezuela—I don't think any of those people are in favor of military intervention.

Would we go it alone, I guess, is what I am asking, Mr. Gray. And what is your answer to that?

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, and it is certainly good to see you because I remember our service together on this committee now many, many years ago. I think the answer to that is that the President has not ruled out any option, including a military option. And I think this administration's policy, however, that has been formulated here today by me—and I have been continuing to work with the President on refugees as well as in other areas—has been primarily multilateral in approach.

However, I do not think it would be appropriate for the President of the United States of America to rule out any possibility. To do so would send an inappropriate signal to the dictators, the coup leaders there, and could also potentially jeopardize American lives, because there could be a variety of scenarios where American life could be under threat, as you well know. Based on some of the mention of earlier situations by another member of this distinguished committee, the President of the United States, and correctly so, had to make decisions that sometimes are very painful and very tough.

So I would say to you, Mr. Congressman, that the President's viewpoint is that he has not ruled out any option.

HAITI AND GRENADA

Mr. HYDE. So he is prepared to go along since that is an option. OK. I won't press you further on that.

I must say I am taken by the ability of some people to switch from dove to hawk in rapid succession. For example, I am sure you remember back in 1983 you were vice chair of the Black Caucus when a resolution was circulated, October 28 to be exact, calling for the withdrawal of our forces from Grenada. Back then it was called gun boat diplomacy. And I have a press clipping from that *Washington Post* that was quoted earlier dated October 29, 1983, where some pretty harsh things were said about the invasion of Grenada.

One of the prominent members who is now Chairman of a very important committee told the President in a letter that the invasion was a clear violation of international law. Another gentleman from California said that Grenada posed no clear threat to other Caribbean nations or to American students there and U.S. troops weren't defending anyone. They were the aggressors.

And yet many of those same people, as I say, are all for invading Haiti. Why don't we invade Cuba? As long as we are in the neighborhood and we are going to reestablish democracy, why pass up Cuba, Mr. Gray?

Mr. GRAY. Well, first of all, you have asked about five or six questions.

One, I don't think that that newspaper article quotes me. I don't need to defend the Congressional Black Caucus, even though at one point as a member who happens to be black I served in that very distinguished body just as I served in this one. And yes, I was also the Secretary-Treasurer and Vice Chairman of that, but I was also the Majority Whip, Caucus Chair and Chairman of the Budget Committee, that went beyond the Black Caucus.

I think, as you well know, Mr. Hyde, members of the Black Caucus have their own individual viewpoints on the issue of Grenada, as well as this issue. I don't know what all their viewpoints are, but the last time I served in the caucus, there were always a variety of viewpoints expressed in meetings, and so people sometimes have a tendency to lump them all together and don't make distinctions because we are called the Black Caucus, and because of other things.

My own viewpoint was not the same as you just read. If my name was not associated that with viewpoint in the *Washington Post*—

Mr. HYDE. No, you are not quoted and I didn't quote you.

Mr. GRAY. Secondly, I cannot, I don't really want to get into a comment about liberals, conservatives, moderates, because I have always had problems with those labels even when I served in this body, because I found them to be very misleading. People who are supposed to be liberal sometimes do very conservative things, people who are supposed to be conservative sometimes do liberal things, so I can't comment really on where every member of this body stands in his, quote, political affiliation.

My past experience when I was Budget Committee chairman and majority whip was most members of this body try to accurately reflect what their constituency feels and what they think is right, and that often when we get to it, we make a big mistake and don't give them the benefit of the doubt of why they are saying what they are saying. I always try to avoid that, to listen very carefully to people regardless of whether or not I agree with them.

CUBA

Finally, the last point that you make is the point about Cuba. I think as you look back in our history, we did do some things about Cuba. I think there was sort of a semi-invasion with America back then. I think it was called the Bay of Pigs. I think also we had a huge crisis that almost took us to the brink of nuclear war.

Mr. HYDE. Some say we promised not to invade Cuba as part of the deal.

Mr. GRAY. I don't know. I wasn't around in those days at all. I was just graduating from college and I think clearly that there has been a series of confrontations over the Cuba issue and there was also something unique in that situation that is not in this situation, and that was the struggle between two world superpowers, and that is why we almost went to the brink of nuclear disaster over Cuba.

That has changed today. Communism is in the dustpan of history. Democracy is on the rise and it seems to me that is exactly why we ought to be where we are now in terms of supporting democracy.

For the first time in this hemisphere, other than in Cuba, there is democracy except in Haiti. And that was a fledgling democracy, yes, a fledgling democracy. It wasn't a perfect democracy, it did not have a 300-year history of democracy, but the flowering of democracy must start somewhere. This was a fledgling democracy where all the nations of the world said there was a free and fair election. Nearly 70 percent of the people who participated in that election

voted for a government and then a group of people decided to throw out the result of that election by gunpoint.

I believe that is a profound difference between what existed in Cuba back in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. There are those who probably would argue, well, you don't need—Cuba is moving to free markets and democracy despite what Castro is doing and probably very shortly will be there, but clearly I think as a result of my conversations with leaders in the OAS, they are deeply disturbed that this has happened and they feel very strongly, just as I am sure there were those who felt very strongly that when American lives and interests were threatened in Grenada that an American President had to do something about it, and they feel very strongly that the community needs to do something about, that it should not stand and to leave it there. And to walk away and simply say let it stand sends the wrong signal to the democracies that are on the rise in the last few years in this hemisphere and the democratic movement that we are trying to foster around the world.

CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO INTERVENTION

Again, yes, each place must be looked at individually. There are places in the world we cannot influence. We cannot be the determiner. There are places where even if we want to do something there is not clear support. So when you talk about Bosnia and Serbia, that conflict and the Eastern European conflict, it is a much more complex situation there where our ability to influence events is limited by a host of things, including differences in the world community.

But here in Haiti, Congressman, you have got the OAS and the United Nations in agreement that there must be something done to prevent this stealing of democracy even in its flower. What we have decided multilaterally, working together, is to move to tough sanctions. Those sanctions have only been in place for about 3½ weeks and so it is our hope that these diplomatic efforts would bring some sense to the coup leaders.

CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON GRENADA INTERVENTION

Mr. HYDE. I appreciate everything you have said, Ambassador Gray, and I know my time is up, but I just want to make one more statement. I think it is fair to comment from those of us who were here during the Grenada situation and who also felt democracy was at bay in Grenada and when the President did something about it, that was strenuously resisted by people who today are advocating the invasion of Haiti.

And one of them was yourself because H. Con. Res. 199, you were a cosponsor of that and that on November 14 called upon the President to withdraw armed forces from Grenada, seek ways to restore stability to Grenada, and allow the Grenadan people to determine their future government.

Mr. GRAY. Well, Congressman, I would like to look at that record that—

Mr. HYDE. You may be right now, but you will forgive me for remembering that.

Mr. GRAY. No, no. That is appropriate. The record stands for itself. I would like to look at that vote because the President eventu-

ally did that. He withdrew troops from Grenada. He got an international force composed of the Barbadians, the Jamaicans, and the CARICOM countries to go in and act as the civil law authority. So I would like to look at the date of that because apparently President Reagan did listen to those who voted for it and he did withdraw U.S. troops after intervening, after he perceived a threat to American lives that were involved there, the students at the medical school, and also as a result of the overflow of democracy there at gun barrel when the duly elected leader of that country, Mr. Bishop, was assassinated.

I think, if my memory serves me correctly, that vote was to get out as quickly as possible, which eventually they did, and a multi-national force went in and provided force.

I would also say to you, Congressman, all of us in this democracy, that is the wonderful thing about being American and being in the world as democracy: We do have the ability to change our minds. And we would like to provide that to the people of Haiti.

SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS IN HAITI

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gray, do you see any threat at the moment to the lives of any Americans in Haiti?

Mr. GRAY. At this point, I do not, but I could imagine that there could be a threat to American lives. There are tens of thousands of Americans, not only American citizens who live there, but there are those there involved in missionary work, humanitarian work, our own embassy people who are there. I would hope—

Chairman HAMILTON. At the present time, there is no threat to them?

Mr. GRAY. I do not see one.

Chairman HAMILTON. OK. I have Mr. Payne next. Then Mr. Roth, Mr. Wynn, Mr. Leach, and then Mr. Oberstar.

Mr. Payne.

HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I, too, am very pleased you have taken on this assignment. I have been one of the strong critics of the Clinton policy on Haiti and I hope that you will help with straightening the policy out.

I was listening to the discussion about Cuba and I think it was a little bit before that Bay of Pigs that we decided to get involved—I guess it was back in 1898 when the Hearst Publications were talking about a threat and the MAINE was put on fire and a war began due to the yellow journalism, I think they called it, so our involvement in Cuba has certainly been a very rocky one so far as military force is concerned.

COST OF EMBARGO ENFORCEMENT

Also just a comment, I guess when you start tallying up the costs of the U.S. Government as relates to Haiti, I don't know how—I don't know what those ships that are around Haiti enforcing the embargo would be doing. I don't know if they would be on the land somewhere sitting around, I assume that they would be riding around somewhere. So I get confused when we look at the cost of

an activity when that activity, if it wasn't that, it was no more than just floating around, the cost of those sailors and engineers and ships and fuel would be ongoing anyhow.

U.S. POLICY ON AMNESTY

So let me just ask a quick question. So there has been some criticism of your predecessor of a number of things, but one was that he was promoting a broad amnesty which would pardon human rights violations over and above the amnesty for political crimes already decreed by President Aristide in compliance with the Governors Island Accord. What is your current position on such amnesty dealings?

Should they be broadened more and open ended?

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, that is a very difficult issue to deal with. I am not sure that the United States or the community of nations have the right to override the constitution of the people of Haiti. There is a constitution. Those who are guilty of wrongdoing, murders, assassination, maiming, are provided for in law and I am not sure that the United States can tell President Aristide, even if we wanted to, to do something which would be in violation of his constitution and an abrogation of his responsibilities as President.

However, I do believe that if you look back at the Governors Island Accord, President Aristide has agreed in principle that with regard to nonviolent crimes there ought to be some kind of reconciliation that involves amnesty for those who participated in this government led by the coup leaders. My own position is that is something we have to look at with regard to the Constitution of Haiti, what is the desire of the duly elected leadership, the Parliament and the President and the restored democracy.

I think it would be very difficult for us to dictate that, and to do so would perhaps raise questions about whether we really are committed to the democratic process.

Mr. PAYNE. I see that it was reported that the South African Government, Mr. Mandela, has decreed amnesty for prior crimes with one proviso, that individuals admit that they perpetrated a crime, that they committed a crime. And that might be something to look at. There is another—

Mr. GRAY. I am sure, by the way, Congressman Payne, that Mr. Aristide is aware of that precedent, and I know based on the speech he gave in Belem at the OAS meeting he talked extensively about reconciliation and the need to put retribution and vengeance behind them if there was to be a movement to prosperity.

BROADENING THE GOVERNMENT

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Also on the question of broadening the government, I know that some time ago there was an attempt to broaden the government, but to put actual opponents—I mean, military people perhaps, General Cedras as a member of the cabinet—but not Cedras as they are suggesting Cedras leave, but they are suggesting maybe Francois, Michel Francois should stay and serve in some capacity.

I would hope that with the broadening of the government that we don't go overboard in—I could see other elected parliamentarians, but to select coup leaders, persons who attempted to murder

President Aristide when he was trying to flee the country, I would hope that the question of broadening the government does not include a guy who the last time you saw had a gun pointed at your head and I think the last Ambassador was really attempting to get everybody involved.

IMMIGRATION QUOTAS

But I just will wind down on the question that you feel the U.N. being involved there was some criticism about the U.S. and the immigration policy because, as you know, it has been stated by some of the national security people that they felt that about maybe 2 percent of the people coming out were political refugees, which I assume there was going to be a quota imposed and 1,400 people came out last month, which means that if they were doing a 2 percent quota, that means that 70 people would have been classified as political refugees.

It seems kind of rough to come up with a system where you are going to predetermine that, but since time is running out, the other question is the FRAHP organization, which is murdering people throughout Haiti and so forth, have people who are right here in the United States. They have offices and so forth.

Have you considered anything about requesting that that organization be sent—their visas be removed and those people sent back to Haiti?

Mr. GRAY. On the question of quotas, I want to make it very, very clear that our policy does not involve any quotas on refugees whatsoever. The process that we are putting in place will seek to provide fair hearings so that those who seek asylum and are under threat are granted that asylum. There will not be a quota under this policy.

SUPPORT FOR HAITIAN SELF-DETERMINATION

Secondly, broad-based coalition governments. I think it is very easy for us in the United States to sit back and tinker with other countries as to what we would like them to be like in their democracy. I believe that democracy means exactly democracy. It means allowing the people to vote, to have a choice to correct their mistakes, change their viewpoints, just as we do in this country, and it would be a terrible mistake for people in this country or in the world community, to try to put together some theoretical government which might work well in the U.K. or Canada or the United States but be against the wishes of those who voted. Therefore, you would be undercutting democracy because what you would be saying is that all you have to do is take over the democracy at any point and then someone could be forced into changing election results simply because you put a gun to his head.

I don't think that that is the signal we want to send, and it is certainly not the signal I want to send. I think President Aristide is aware of the need for reconciliation. I think he is an astute enough political leader to understand that means encompassing elements that not only voted for him, but also if you are going to govern, you have to have working relationships with other elements. And I will leave that to the people of Haiti, rather than try

to impose some concept of democracy that has been flourishing here and that overturns their vote.

With regard to the FRAHP organization, I am not aware of that. If you will give me the information, we will look into that. No, I am not aware of that.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Mr. TORRICELLI [presiding.] Mr. Roth.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ARISTIDE

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gray, it is nice to see you again and I want to join my other colleagues who have complimented you for your commitment to this problem and we wish you all the very best because I think there has been here on Capitol Hill a feeling that we have not had a steady hand in this particular policy and that it has vacillated somewhat. And with you, I think there is a sense that we are going to have more of a definite policy and I think that is a good sign.

In this commitment to restoring democracy, and that is what we want to do, restore democracy in Haiti; would that mean restoring Aristide absolutely or can we have a restoration of democracy without Aristide? In other words, could we have some sort of agreement where we say, OK, let's set up a new election and let a new government be formed?

Mr. GRAY. I don't believe you can do that because essentially if do you that, what you have done is you have allowed the coup leaders to take over the country, throw out a free and fair election that everyone in the world judged as free and fair, and then what you will be doing is sending a signal not only in that country that you will allow the democratic process to be overthrown at the barrel of a gun. No, I don't believe you can do that.

I believe that if you are going to be true to the goal of restoring democracy, you cannot sit here or somewhere else and say but forget that two-thirds of the people voted for him. I think in our own country we have got some pretty strong feeling even though I may or you may not like the viewpoints of a certain elected official if that person goes through the process and wins fairly and freely, you have got a right to work hard to put him out of office, but you do not have a right, except under very limited circumstances, you know, criminal behavior, to say to the people that doesn't count.

My viewpoint is that if you say we are going to restore democracy, but, oh, we want you to have another election, that does not mean the restoration of the person who received two-thirds of the votes that all the world judged free and fair, I think what you would then be doing is sending a signal, Congressman, that anybody who wants to overthrow an election that he didn't agree with, get a gun and you can do it.

PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION

Mr. ROTH. But you know, here we are at an impasse. I mean we got sanctions. We are trying various options and so on. Couldn't we come to a resolution where internally this could be resolved? I remember a number of years ago you and I were working with Ethiopia and having this amendment we were going through all these

gyrations and doing this policy and that policy. I mean our Government was.

And then in the end the Ethiopian solution came from within Ethiopia and I think that has to happen in Haiti, too. So rather than being absolutely committed to saying Aristide has got to be returned, otherwise we can't have democracy, couldn't we have a solution where we bring both groups together and try to work it out that way?

Mr. GRAY. I remember our working together and that was a very significant accomplishment. I would say two things Ethiopia is different from Haiti in the fact that we were not trying to replace the Communist government with a democratic government nor had there been a democratic election judged by the world where the leader had been elected by a two-thirds majority and thrown out by a Communist government. If you remember what we were trying was to stop that Communist government, the Menjistu government, from oppressing its people.

They had been going through literally slaughter of dissident voices. And what you and I did was we came up with a sanction bill, a bill that would attack the commodities that they exported and we said if you continue this behavior of killing people and violating human rights, you will pay a very stiff price. Because you and I wrote that bill, a Democrat, a Republican, we sent a signal and that signal was change the behavior or else this bill may become law.

And if you remember, before that bill became law, I think it even got out of the subcommittee—I don't even remember if it got out of this full committee, but before that happened, Menjistu came to his senses and stopped the human rights violations and the slaughter and began to release people who he had imprisoned for political reasons. We were not trying to force the Communist government out. We were trying to force the end of the human rights slaughter that was going on.

And in this situation, there is a similarity. If we in this country bipartisanly—Democrats, Republicans, conservatives, moderates and liberals—began to say to these coup leaders who have stolen democracy, you must step down and you must allow the government to resume its activity, the duly elected government which is not only Aristide but also the Parliament to continue its activity. And by the way, Mr. Aristide did not win all of the seats in that Parliament and so there are balances there.

If we begin to say that loud and clear as well as these sanctions that have only been in place 3 weeks, and send a set of credibly strong signals and not a policy or a set of signals that go from left to right, up, down, I believe that these people will come to their senses just as Menjistu, so in a way there is a similarity.

COST OF SHIP RENTALS

Mr. ROTH. My time is up but I was going to mention before there was a big question here about the cost, and many people are asking us—for example, we have all these ships in the U.S. Navy. Why did we have to rent a Ukrainian ship to help us with the processing of these people, the people that are refugees?

Mr. GRAY. Well, the reason, Congressman, as I understand it, is that ships that we have that are in service are in use. Those that are not are mothballed. The cost of getting them prepared to go to sea would have been more exorbitant than renting a Ukrainian oceangoing vessel. That is the reason. We are using—by the way, one Navy ship is a hospital ship that was available did not have to go through a de-mothballing refurbishing and as a result the cost factor—but I will be glad to give you that.

Mr. ROTH. Again my time is up, but it seems almost inconceivable with all the ships we have in the U.S. Navy there isn't a single ship we couldn't use. We had to go out and rent another country's ship to process people. It is hard for people to understand that.

Mr. GRAY. I understand.

[The information follows:]

On May 8, the Clinton administration initiated the policy of immediate processing for Haitians fleeing their country. It was also decided to conduct processing close to Haiti to be more convenient and less costly, first to transport the Haitians to a processing center and, for those not approved for status, back to Haiti.

The U.S. military explored various options to meet this need. The U.S. Navy has only two passenger ships ("troop ships"): one was in the United Kingdom and the other would have run up costs (\$45,000 per day) significantly higher than the vessel chosen. Other possibilities were determined to be unfit because they could not meet availability, capacity, cost, proximity, technical suitability or other requisites.

Ultimately, the best bid offered two vessels, the "Gruziya" and "Ivan Franco," for \$34,000 and \$29,000 per day, respectively, plus approximately \$30,000 per day for food, fuel, and port charges. The "Gruziya" was available first, and was replaced several weeks later by the "Ivan Franco."

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Wynn.

GRADITUDE TO GOVERNMENTS OF JAMAICA AND TURKS AND CAICOS

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and also, Mr. Gray, thank you. We appreciate the hard work you have already invested in this project and I must say that I, too, have had my confidence in the administration restored based upon your appointment. Don't fall over on us, though.

I want to note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the Government of Jamaica and also to the Government of the Turks and Caicos for their assistance in this effort, and I would hope that when we discuss foreign aid, as well as trade, that we would duly note the efforts and repay their support in kind.

FEAR OF RETRIBUTION AMONG MILITARY

Mr. Gray, I would like to pursue three questions. First, a scenario has been described to me under which the fear of retribution on the part of the military rank and file is so great that even if the military coup leaders were inclined to step down as a result of sanctions that they would be likely subjects of assassination and that the rank and file military's role is also a major impediment to a peaceful resolution.

If that were in fact the case, and please correct me if I am wrong, does this indicate that a precondition of some sort of peaceful settlement would require the broadening of the Aristide government?

Mr. GRAY. I am not sure that that scenario is correct, Congressman, because in order for President Aristide to receive the kind of mandate that he got from the people in a free and fair election, obviously a lot of those in the military must have voted for him, especially the rank and file. Also you have to remember that many of those in the rank and file, as well as the security force, police forces, had the responsibility of providing protection. They also had access to weapons.

If they wanted to, there might have been an attempt to assassinate him prior to the election or after the election. So the viewpoint that the entire military, all of the security forces, police and military are opposed to the return of President Aristide because of fear seems not to really connect when you look at the election and the overwhelming mandate. I suspect that there were a lot of enlisted, low level, noncommissioned officers who voted for Aristide.

The fact of the matter is—

Mr. WYNN. I don't doubt that they voted for Aristide. The information that I get from persons on the scene is that they are fearful that by virtue of association with the military they would be the subject of a retribution, but if you believe that is not the case, I am certainly encouraged.

Mr. GRAY. I don't think that is the case for two reasons. One, I think some of them supported Aristide. That is my first point.

The second point is if you have listened to what President Aristide has said about reconciliation and about the Governors Island Accord, there was a general amnesty agreed to with which the military leaders refused to comply by not stepping down last October. So I am not sure that is a correct scenario.

I think that, one, President Aristide has said on a number of occasions to me privately, but also publicly, the latest being his Monday speech at the OAS meeting where he has talked about reconciliation and understands very clearly that you cannot run a government if what your first duty is is to go out and try and lead a mob or retribution against certain elements of that country. I think he understands that.

U.N. POST-INTERVENTION ROLE

Mr. WYNN. I think he probably does. I am not sure that elements of the military understand that or at least feel comforted sufficiently in that. But at any rate, the second question I have is if there is a—whether there is a firm commitment from the U.N. mission to move in and perform the long-term peacekeeping function, policing function that I think most of us believe is required. The sentiment seems to be that one of the reasons we ought not to intervene militarily is because we could not get out.

Is it your statement that we have the commitment from the U.N. to perform that role so that in the event of a U.S. intervention we would not have to also perform the follow-up functions?

NO DECISION MADE ABOUT MILITARY ACTION

Mr. GRAY. I think for me to comment on that question would lead one to believe that a decision has been made about a U.S. military action. There has not been any such decision. The Presi-

dent simply said that all the options are on the table, including that possibility.

However, I would again refer you to where the policy has been and where it continues to be. It has been a policy that has committed to return democracy, to use diplomacy, and sanctions, and has moved multilaterally in every aspect at every instance, whether in dealing with the refugees or in dealing with sanctions.

PRECONDITIONS FOR INTERVENTION

Mr. WYNN. My time is running short. I want to pursue one other question. There has been a lot of debate this morning about what would be the precondition for military intervention. Some have raised the question of sufficient strategic importance, others have raised the question of vital military interest, others have said there is precedence in the past with Grenada.

The question I have for you recognizes that the United States and the administration is not committed to military intervention and is committed to sanctions. Has a decision been made that the conditions, circumstances you related here were sufficient to warrant military intervention, if they chose to pursue it?

Mr. GRAY. My position here, my advice to the President, is let us continue to push these sanctions on all diplomatic avenues, but you made—in your question you made a statement that implied the military option is off the table. It is not.

Mr. WYNN. I am assuming it is on the table. I am wondering whether the preconditions have been agreed to.

Mr. GRAY. I would simply say to you that the President would have to be the judge of when and where and under what circumstances. I would not be prepared at this public hearing to tell the dictators what such a time and occasion would be. My message to the coup leaders is they must step down, and the faster the better.

Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Leach.

U.S. PUBLIC UNPREPARED FOR MILITARY OPTION

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also welcome you, Ambassador Gray. To say that you embellish your office is an understatement. We appreciate it.

It strikes me that if there is any aspect of this whole issue that has been understated is the human suffering in Haiti.

We also have a circumstance where we are obviously involved. We have got 1 million Haitians in this country and of a uniqueness, most of these residents have really adopted a work ethic.

My concern is that I am not convinced we are getting a total frankness from our Government. I think the military option is not only on the table, but it is right at the front of the desk and that the American people have not been prepared.

One reason that it is unfortunately at the front of the desk is not that our policy has made significant progress as has been implied today, but we have had a series of failures. The Harlen County incident where American military engineers were turned back by thugs is not something that did anything except impair the reputation of the United States in Haiti.

The sanctions policy is one that I am told is working to the benefit of the government and enriching those in power because they control the fewer goods that become available. It is actually becoming an instrument of governmental policy rather than one that seems to restrict the government. Then you have in place the prospect of what I am told from the military is almost a ready-made prescription for disaster, the idea of using a cruise ship for a ship-board processing. That concept is so certain to cause an exodus of people that will be of unmanageable dimensions that the necessity of a military intervention becomes that much more likely either before it is put in place as people think it through or after a disastrous or an unmanageable circumstance develops.

And so my only concern is that the administration be frank. Its policies have not worked. It is not all its fault. Some of these aspects of the problem are fairly intractable. But that to the degree we are close to military action, I think the American people ought to be prepared for it. And I am wondering if you want to address that subject.

DEFENSE OF HAITI POLICY

Mr. GRAY. Yes, Congressman. I would like to address it. The three points that you have raised.

One is U.S. policy is not working and has not worked. Let me—and I am not here to defend what has transpired over two administrations, not simply the Clinton administration but also the Bush administration. And I think it would be a waste of your time and my time to go back to the Bush administration, the early days of the Clinton administration, and look at what each administration over the last 3 years has done incorrectly or sent mixed signals.

I think what I would rather do, Congressman, is talk about what we are trying to do at this point and where we are. I think that we are beginning to very clearly send a set of very strong signals not only to the allies who are involved with us, because now you have got more support in the community of nations in this hemisphere and the world community than ever before. The United Nations Security Council does not often take such steps as it has taken in U.N. Resolution 917. You have not seen the kind of statements coming from the OAS as you saw coming out of Belem just this past weekend.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO REFUGEE ISSUE

You now have the United Nations High Commission on Refugees involved in a partnership where we are recognizing that the refugee issue is an international issue. It is not a south Florida issue. It is not a U.S. issue. If you go and visit with the foreign minister of the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos and some of the CARICOM countries, if you think there is a problem in Florida, you should see in those countries where their economic systems, their social service systems are being deluged with the numbers of refugees that are going there.

In fact, someone pointed out to me in one of my conversations with the foreign minister of the Bahamas that the number of Haitians there, refugees who have come in the last few years, would be the same as if 40 million to 50 million refugees came from any

country to the United States in the last 5 to 10 years. And you can imagine what that would do to your whole infrastructure.

There are those in the eastern Caribbean who are living this on a daily basis. And what we have been able to do is get recognition that this is an international problem, that the solution of the refugees as well as the political problem is going to take international cooperation.

DEFENSE OF SANCTIONS REGIME

We have had these sanctions. Tough sanctions. Not the voluntary sanctions of over a year-and-a-half ago, not the limited sanctions of arms embargo. I mean, Haiti doesn't need any arms.

There is no threat of an invading Army last year, so you had an arms and oil embargo. For the first time you have got real teeth in a sanction. Those sanctions have only been in place since May 21.

You already have countries in the world, the Four Friends, OAS, saying let's move a notch higher. Let's look at financial transactions that do affect the wealthy. Let's not wait for 6 months for the sanctions to be felt by the wealthy. Let's do something now for them to feel it. Let's cut out commercial airline traffic so they can't go to Paris or New York on shopping trips and return while there is misery and suffering.

So I think you are beginning to see a series of very strong credible messages being sent. The United States is in the lead with it but also we have got the OAS. You have seen the Dominican Republic border begin to be sealed. You also are seeing the United Nations and OAS talking about a reconstituted United Nations mission in Haiti which recognizes a bigger role, a bigger mandate, which I think clearly sends a strong signal.

In fact, I had one diplomat tell me that the most important thing we could do was seal the Dominican Republican border and get them involved because the military leaders thought that they would never have to worry: There was always a back door.

So I guess what I am saying to you is that this is a policy that has changed in the last month. I think we have made progress.

FALLOUT FROM IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

Mr. LEACH. Ambassador, I appreciate that very much, and my time is expired, but I would only like to stress that when you ratchet up sanctions, you also impel massive increases not only in poverty but in exodus of people. So ironically, some of the aspects of our policy exacerbate the problem from the United States' perspective. In my judgment unless the message the Ambassador Gray is putting forth is heeded in the next few weeks, not months, the likelihood that the policy will be run by a man with stars on his shoulder instead of a diplomat's stripes is very, very large.

And it is partly the case because our policies impel exacerbation of problems and some of our policies themselves have not worked. And it is a sad, unfortunate circumstance but I personally think that this administration is going to be confronted with choices that none of us would like it to be confronted with on an earlier time-frame and that kind of frankness ought to be expressed as strongly as possible.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. GRAY. I appreciate that.

CALL FOR MILITARY ACTION

Mr. OBERSTAR. [Initial comments spoken in the Creole language.]

I am just going to say, welcome, when you were working on Haiti. When you were here among us, you were an important man. Now you are the important man for Haiti. And I just recited a Creole expression, "monbourik charge." That means you are a loaded mule. But there is a balance to that: "Mana chose charge polieu", many hands make light work. You haven't had your charge lightened by the advice you have been given today.

We have heard talk about consistency and about doctrine and about what happened in the past in other countries and my very, very sympathetic colleague just a moment ago, Mr. Leach, saying that on the one hand, sanctions are of a way of bringing pressure but they create pressures for us by putting pressure on people. That is all true.

I lived in Haiti 3½ years, as you may know. I love Haiti. I love the people of Haiti. I think I know that country. I traveled all through it. By foot. By jeep. I know Jacmel. I know Cap-Haitien. I know east to west. I know the Haitian people. I was in Haiti during the Bay of Pigs when the Haitians expected Americans to invade Haiti and rid them of Duvalier. Haitians have long looked to the United States, perhaps for leadership but also for salvation.

Haitians fought in the war of revolution for the United States. They were the second Republic in this hemisphere. They tried. They have not succeeded well. They didn't have a good example under colonial rule by the French. They tried to establish government and it hasn't worked. For 200 years of independence, they have only had one opportunity for democracy and that was in the election of December 1990.

And as I went as part of the observer team along with our colleague, Mr. Goss, from voting place to voting place and asked the people as they left, some of whom stood in line for hours and hours to vote, what did you vote for? Why did you vote? "Nous voulons pour liberte." "We voted for freedom." "We didn't vote for a job." They didn't say we voted to get a better deal on the International Monetary Fund. They voted for one thing. Get rid of Ton-ton Macoutes. Get rid of Duvalierists. And live a decent life, free from fear. And that freedom was snatched from them by the military, by Aristide's own mistakes. He was the one who put Cedras in place and replaced my student, General Abraham, who made the election happen.

The only way we are going to establish democracy and give it a chance, give it a breath, is to wipe out that nest of vipers by military action. It is a job over a morning or an afternoon. A plan to get in and a plan to get out. I have said it since that action happened in September 1991. I know it takes some thought to go in and it takes some thought to stay and it takes some thought about how we get out. That is not hard.

But meanwhile, the very sanctions that have been imposed on this country have caused the most severe deterioration in Haiti in its entire history. There is no longer poverty; there is destitution.

There was erosion before we were beginning to make some progress in the last few years after the ouster of Baby Doc. Now that progress has been reversed.

Your report says that electricity is on for only a few hours. That was the case when I lived in Haiti 35 years ago. That wasn't new. What is new is that we returned to that condition after making some progress.

And talk about whether we can go in or whether we need to do this or do that, if our principle, if our doctrine is oil, and we go in and help a country, then that is the universal principle. But if our doctrine is self-determination of people, if our doctrine is to avoid suffering and pain and misery, starvation, abject destitution of people, then we have to do something. That crowd in the carte de generale in Port-au-Prince is going to listen and laugh while we monkey around with sanctions. The only policy that is going to work to relieve the yoke of oppression is U.S. force.

We have been involved in Haiti for 200 years. We have an interest there. We have an interest in seeing the people live decent, healthy lives. They don't ask to be rich. They don't even ask for a really great way of life. They ask to be rid of the oppression, the misery that has dogged them. Yes, they are economic refugees when they leave Haiti but they are political refugees when they come back. You have a heavy load.

I have only one advice: Don't wait too long. The Haitian people can't wait that long. They are long-suffering. They are good, caring, wonderful people. They are now being turned into a nation of destitution and of crime and of violence and that has never happened in their whole history.

Do your job well. But don't be afraid and don't listen to the handwringers and the critics of the past. This is an opportunity to do something good and lasting for a people, for a whole people.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar.

There are, Mr. Gray, three of us remaining, with your indulgence. I don't know whether Mr. Wynn or Mr. Payne have additional questions they would like to ask.

Did you want to respond?

ALL OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN

Mr. GRAY. I just wanted to say to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Oberstar, that I share your deep concern for the Haitian people even though I have not had the unique experience that you have had by your service and time spent in that country.

We hope that these sanctions will work, but we are also very clear, the President is very clear, that other options are open and we are looking for appropriate advice such as that given by members of this committee.

OPPOSITION TO MILITARY ACTION

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray, I, for one, hope that a military invasion of Haiti is no more than an option. But I am somewhat fearful that it is more of a decision that has already been made.

And I fear that as I have tried to make clear, not because I don't want to see the military leadership of Haiti removed, but because

indeed I would hope that the new Haiti can indeed be democratic and not have to live in the shadow of having been restored to office on the wings of a foreign military force.

It appears to me that we are entering into some new age of paternalism here. People try to make the argument that Haiti is different, that there are different circumstances. That, in fact, the U.S. Government is not simply some other force, some different element in world politics. When we do things, we establish patterns.

When we take actions, they become precedents. It has served no other purpose here today, and I know amused more than a few, to hear some argue strenuously for the sovereignty of Grenada and the self-determination of Nicaragua, now to argue for an invasion of Haiti.

I was against each of those invasions, because I do not want to see the United States as a paternalistic power in this hemisphere. I argue again for the same consideration for the Haitian people.

Contrary to what might have been said—and I know, Mr. Gray, that you understand, Haiti does have a democratic experience. As Mr. Oberstar suggested, it was the second Republic in this hemisphere. It had a thriving democracy in much of the 19th century. The invasion of the United States and our occupation of Haiti in this hemisphere did not contribute to that democratic experience.

During our occupation, and the years after we left, Haiti was not freer or more democratic. And I see no reason to believe that an American incursion now at this point in history will indeed strengthen those democratic institutions.

Somehow, the responsibility for gaining freedom in Haiti and establishing democratic institutions has become as much of an American responsibility as a Haitian responsibility. The United States can assist, but we cannot substitute for any nation in their fight to establish a democratic institution. Indeed, I think that lesson has probably been lost.

During this discussion today, I posed the question of whether or not there were any OAS or United Nations charter legal basis for what we might be about to undertake. People have addressed the point, others have raised the question, but indeed I think it is instructive that no member of this committee nor the administration is even attempting to provide a legal foundation for a military incursion in Haiti.

Some think it is good policy. Others think it makes sense. But in the U.S. Congress, under the leadership of an American administration, which are the successors to the authors of the United Nations charter, the nation which claims to be ruled by laws, not believed to be led by men, we make no such argument.

ASSURANCE SOUGHT ON COMPLIANCE WITH WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Finally, for my part, I would only like to pose the following questions. First, is it the intention of the administration, to your knowledge, Mr. Gray, to return to this Congress before or simultaneously with the military invasion of Haiti to seek legal authorization?

Mr. GRAY. It is the intention of the President to carry out his role as President of the United States and the protection of American interests, property and lives, and to remain in consultation with this Congress.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Is that consistent with the War Powers Resolution?

Mr. GRAY. It is to be expected it will be consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I would interpret that to mean then there would be a vote in the U.S. Congress consistent with that act. I assume that is both of our interpretations.

Mr. GRAY. That is not what I said, Congressman. I said it is his responsibility to protect the interests and lives of the American people, and to consult with Congress.

Mr. TORRICELLI. But not consistent with the War Powers Resolution?

Mr. GRAY. Consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

Mr. TORRICELLI. The War Powers Resolution does require a vote.

Mr. GRAY. Under every circumstance?

Mr. TORRICELLI. The War Powers Resolution requires a vote if —

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, would you want any President of the United States of America to come and have a vote, a debate, as one who has been in this body and knows how that process works, while American lives are being threatened?

Mr. TORRICELLI. The War Powers Resolution doesn't require that, Mr. Gray. It requires that after forces are introduced, the President comes to Congress and asks for a vote of authorization.

Mr. GRAY. I understood your question to mean you would want a vote before any kind of action take place.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I am seeking assurances that the War Powers Resolution would be enacted. The War Powers Resolution does not require a prior vote. It requires a vote after forces have been placed into harm's way.

What I am seeking is assurances that the law will be followed, much as you and I for many years in a variety of instances asked President Reagan and President Bush to invoke that act.

Mr. GRAY. My answer stands as it was stated at the beginning.

APPEALS PROCESS SOUGHT BY UNHCR

Mr. TORRICELLI. There is a story in the *Washington Post* today on the resistance of the UNHCR to reaching an agreement about processing. Indeed, part of that UNHCR, according to the article, is requiring that there be an appeals process in the processing of refugees.

I wonder if you can speak to whether or not that is accurate.

Mr. GRAY. I am sorry, Congressman.

Mr. TORRICELLI. The UNHCR, according to the *Washington Post*, is resisting full participation in the processing of refugees pending the providing of an appeals process by the United States.

Mr. GRAY. I am not aware of anything such as that at all. I am familiar with that story. I saw it briefly this morning. We are working on a number of questions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in an MOU to clarify what the partnership is.

There are a number of questions that have to be answered, including how we are going to work out the appeal. To imply that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.S. Gov-

ernment, and this administration, are at a fundamental disagreement, it is not the case at all.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I am glad to hear that, and indeed would urge that the U.S. Government does not need guidance and determination of American law from the UNHCR. The U.S. Government is fully capable of providing rights to those who seek access to our country and implementing our laws without the United Nations' advice.

Considering the recent record of the UNHCR in meeting its own responsibilities, one would think they would hesitate to be making recommendations to the United States.

REPORT OF VIOLENCE ON DOMINICAN BORDER

Finally, I would hope that we could be providing some distance, in fact disassociating ourselves, from the use of deadly force as recently occurred in the Dominican Republic to enforce the embargo. While indeed I think we legitimately asked the Dominican Republic to enforce the embargo, shooting unarmed Haitians attempting to smuggle into their country is not consistent, I think, with the policies of our country, or indeed our best interests.

Could we use this occasion to disassociate ourselves from these actions taken against Haitian citizens which resulted in the loss of life?

The United States does not have a death penalty in our own country for people who smuggle products into this country. I don't see why we would have one in Haiti.

Mr. GRAY. Congressman, I am not familiar with the details of the incident you are describing. I do not take press reports as being accurate with regard to that. I have not seen any communique with regard to what you were talking about. And before I do that, I will not pass judgment, nor will this administration, on what occurred or did not occur.

Mr. TORRICELLI. The report, as I understand it, is of border guards in the Dominican Republic fired on a Haitian—

Mr. GRAY. I understand what the report is. I do not know if it is accurate. And so to report on it—

U.S. HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS

Mr. TORRICELLI. Finally, is there guidance that you could give us as to at what point the embargo on Haiti causes a loss of life or degree of suffering, that if so, shocks the conscience, that it becomes morally reprehensible. Is there a point of which you are aware that the policy must be changed because it simply becomes unacceptable?

The Harvard University study, for example, which I know some dispute, cites that the loss of life could be 1,000 a month due to the inability to treat infants; other numbers are far less. Could you give some guidance on when you think in fact this has gone too far?

Mr. GRAY. First of all, Congressman, let me again reiterate what I said in my statement, and also in answer to an earlier question. The image that the United States and this administration does not care about hungry children suffering in Haiti is inaccurate. In the U.N. sanctions as well as in our programs currently going on which

this committee authorizes and another appropriates, we are still carrying out feeding programs. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, we are preparing to expand those feeding programs right now, as a result of the economic sanctions.

We also are carrying out other humanitarian efforts with non-governmental organizations. There was a question earlier by Mr. Ballenger about getting through the red tape. This government, this administration, wants the sanctions to bite those who need to be bitten, but to try not to exacerbate the suffering of children or the very poor. And that is why we have the humanitarian efforts that are going on now that involve millions of U.S. aid dollars currently, and we are talking about increasing that.

So those who paint a portrait of somehow these sanctions are going to cause thousands of Haitian children to die, no. What is causing death in that country is oppression, thuggery, the lack of democracy.

And let me point out that we are serious about bringing a change. We have to remember something that some of us said. Yes, sanctions may hurt, but dictatorships kill. And so we are in the process, this administration, of providing food right now. Nearly 1 million people being fed. We are going to be asking for 300,000 more. We are also reviewing the \$15 million Title III food program that will help provide food and help fund an additional 75,000 jobs. So there is not a neglect, Congressman.

I don't know what the Harvard study is based on. I don't know if they have ever been to Port-au-Prince or how they come to that conclusion. But if you look at the facts, we are currently spending millions of dollars to feed the hungry, to provide for the poor, medication, and as we pointed out in the questions earlier, we are trying to make sure that even the requirements of the U.N. are changed in such a way so that medicine can get in.

SANCTIONS TARGETED TO SPECIFIC POPULATION

And we are hoping that as we look at these sanctions and what the Four Friends and the OAS said this week in terms of targeting, racheting them up with regard to financial transactions and commercial airlines, we believe that they will affect those who need to be affected.

How long that will take, Congressman, we don't have a clear deadline. We are going to be evaluating them daily, weekly, in terms of what the options are and what the next steps are.

I would also remind you that the actions the United States has taken have been taken not unilaterally, but multilaterally, the OAS, the United Nations. So those who see our policy as somehow being done by ourselves, that is not accurate.

So we would continue to work in that same way, Congressman, no matter what additional steps and options we follow, and whatever may come. We are hoping—

Mr. TORRICELLI. I am glad to hear that because of course that has been the entire thrust of my comments. I hope the policy not only is multilateral but will remain multilateral. Of course, that means working with institutions based on their own charters and laws.

Mr. Payne, do you have any questions?

Mr. PAYNE. Yes.

IMPACT OF FLIGHT BAN ON NGO'S

Mr. TORRICELLI. There is a point I have heard raised that the banning of international flights could cause a flight of humanitarian workers and human rights observers, people who fear they won't be able to leave the country, might understandably be in danger and thereby take the last opportunity to get out.

This, ironically, could create the situation of making it easier for the Haitian military to abuse people and exacerbate the human rights and the humanitarian situation. Can you comment on that?

Mr. GRAY. Yes. One of the things that happens when you are dealing with dictatorships, oppressive regimes, and trying to bring about solutions, Congressman, they are always painful solutions that cause some problem elsewhere, such as sanctions will depress the economy. But if you are willing to bring food in, medicine through nongovernmental organizations, as well as through feeding programs that you sponsor, you tend to offset some of that suffering—perhaps not all of it, but a great deal of it.

In the case of commercial airline flights, I think, as I understand in my conversations with the Four Friends and with the OAS and CARICOM leaders, they are concerned about having the anomalous situation of where a wealthy person in Haiti can get on a French plane or an American plane, go to Paris or New York for a wonderful weekend of shopping and fly back, while the rest of the country is taking these kinds of economic tough measures, because their name does not appear on the list of the coup leaders and their immediate family.

And that we need to very strongly say to the supporters of the coup, is that you are not going to have this kind of mobility. There are those who have expressed a fear that if you ban all airlines, what is the signal that you are sending? Well, you are sending a signal. You are sending it to the coup leaders and their wealthy supporters.

Will that have an effect upon nongovernmental organizations that are working in the feeding programs, medicine programs, missionary programs? It potentially does. It means that at their leisure they cannot go to the airport and catch an American Airlines, an Air Canada, or an Air France, or a Dutch airline or Dominican Republic airline to get out.

It does not mean that if there was a need, we could not provide very quickly transportation for Americans. We are not at this time advising Americans or those organizations to leave. And in our conversations with those organizations, none of them has expressed to us a desire to leave or this will somehow prevent them from doing their work if commercial airlines are banned.

The big problem is the problem that Congressman Ballenger has talked about, which is the U.N. requirement of a case-by-case review on the charter flights, which are often utilized, and we are trying to cut through that red tape and expedite that process.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the Chairman will yield on that point, wearing my aviation hat, the administration has enjoined a ban on charter and cargo service but not commercial airliner service. The problem

from a competitive standpoint and also from an effect on Haiti embargo standpoint, is that those commercial passenger flights carry belly cargo, that is also creating some competitive imbalance in the marketplace, an opportunity for material to get into Haiti. And I would suggest, if not a complete ban on air service, then prohibit belly cargo.

THE CASE FOR SANCTIONS

Mr. GRAY. The gentleman is absolutely correct, and that is one of the concerns.

Let me again go back to a much more fundamental question that is raised by the Congressman's comments and also others'. If you are not willing to support sanctions, and if sanctions are not given a chance to work, then you are increasingly leading toward one solution, and if you don't want to use that solution, and you have made your position very clear, Congressman, on that solution, and then on the other, you don't want to use sanctions because you are afraid somebody is going to get hurt under sanctions, then what is left? What then is left?

Is America going to wipe its hands and say that a bunch of thugs in our hemisphere can take over a country after a free and fair election and we will sit and debate it, when all of our neighbors in the eastern Caribbean—and I would urge members of this committee to travel there to talk to them—when those in the OAS and even in the U.N. are saying, This cannot stand.

Because essentially, if you are not willing to do sanctions, and if you are not willing to look at other tough measures, essentially what you are saying to the military leaders there is, We want to continue to talk with you. We have had talks with them, two occasions, let me remind the committee. I know you are aware of this. Compromise was reached, tough compromises, where Aristide had to give, they had to give. And each time, when it came time to implement those tough compromises, it was not the elected leader of the people who reneged; it was the military leadership.

And finally, the world community after last fall and the Governors Island Accord being not implemented by Cedras and Biamby and Francois, said, That is it.

And so at this point I would simply say, if you don't want sanctions, then you are creating an argument that is I think moving—

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray, I will do my best to get this hearing concluded, but in fairness to the committee, I know of no member of the committee in either political party who appears to oppose sanctions.

My question to you was, is it important in the administration's own mind to recognize the point of suffering or potential loss of life at which associating ourselves with sanctions is no longer morally responsible? It is important that this be announced or made identifiable to the Haitian military.

The administration needs to determine just how much suffering is bearable, how many lives can be lost, before the sanctions option can no longer be allowed to run its course. That can be an argument eventually for disengagement or for a military incursion. But

I think it is something important for the administration to have in its own mind.

Mr. Payne.

OPTIMISM ON POST-INTERVENTION SCENARIO

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

I would suspect that the administration would know when, you know, the people have taken too much and it is more than what they can bear.

I am one of the doves. I also have been opposed to military intervention all along. But I see some other kind of feathers coming up, because it doesn't seem like anything is working with these people who are in charge.

I feel that if there had to be a military intervention, that I would think that it would not—I don't see the long haul where U.S. troops would have to be there forever. I think that there could be the changing of the guard, if you could see in South Africa generals who serve P.W. Botha and then looked after F.W. de Klerk, and now is defending South Africa for President Mandela, I think that, you know, the military has a way of being able to transform itself, especially if we bring in the French Canadian police, as we started to do, for the Port-au-Prince police, and get rid of Francois, and get rid of the downsizing of the military with the Seabees of Harlan County, which unfortunately went back and should not have.

I do think that we can go in and get out without 15 years, as it was in the past.

EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH HAITIAN MILITARY

The other thing, though, I have a question, Mr. Ambassador. It has been rumored that the U.S. Embassy is still a little cozy with some of these military guys. As you know, the former Ambassador was very cozy. From what I understand, they didn't like Mr. Aristide very much. They thought that I guess Bazin was going to win, and were disappointed when the parish priest won, and were disappointed and almost somewhat not condemning the military. As a matter of fact, one of the top-ranking officials told me that the military is the longest-standing institution that Haiti has had and therefore he feels "very comfortable with them," quote, unquote. Is our embassy still cozy like they used to be?

UPDATING LIST OF INDIVIDUALS TARGETED FOR SANCTIONS

And secondly, have the list of targeted people for the visas and the freezing of assets been updated to include people like the illegitimately appointed members of the Parliament, the new de facto government, principal backers of the de facto regime, leaders of FRAHP and others that may not have been in on the earlier list? Has the list been updated and made more inclusive?

Mr. GRAY. The answer to the second question is yes, the list is updated. It is constantly being updated as we gain new information about the supporters of the coup, the members of the falsely, illegitimately appointed FRAHP government have been included, as well as their supporters. So that list is constantly being updated and changed, based upon the criteria that if you are a supporter

of the coup leaders, if we have such evidence, you fall into that category.

EMBASSY COMMUNICATION WITH COUP LEADERS

Secondly, with regard to your first question, Congressman, our U.S. Embassy personnel are empowered to talk with, and receive messages from, those in that illegitimate government, but there is one message that we give, and that is, Step down. That is the one message. That is the official message. However, if any of them want to call to start a conversation and ask our position, we will give them our position. But our position is the government that has been put in place by the military coup leaders is a government that is unconstitutional, illegitimate, has not been recognized by any country in the world, and therefore we don't consider it a government.

Secondly, to the coup leaders, our communication has been to them, live up to the Governors Island Accord where you promised to allow democracy to return and to step down.

CALL FOR MORE DECISIVE U.S. ACTION

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

I am one of those who feel that we have a long-standing responsibility and engagement in Haiti. I think it is a country we have been very closely aligned to, probably more so for some of us than others.

I think that, as it was mentioned, the battalion that fought in Savannah against the British back in 1775 to help the independence of the United States. You had in the 1800's, right in your city of Philadelphia, Bethel Church that runaway slaves could go through to live in Haiti as free people. We could go on and on.

If it wasn't for the Haitians defeating Napoleon's Army, the Louisiana Purchase, which, as you know, was French territory and was a real threat to the United States—as a matter of fact, territorially it was as large as the Continental United States at that time—and the defeat of the great French Army under Napoleon caused France to be in a financial bind, and therefore forced the selling of the Louisiana area which was called the Louisiana Purchase.

And we could go on and on, to World War II. President Roosevelt asked they denude and try to grow rubber plants because we were cutoff from the Pacific. Of course, the denuding started erosion, rubber plants do not grow there. We could go on and on with the relationship between the two countries.

The bottom line is, I think we should have acted more quickly before. I hope we will make some decisive decisions soon, and that democracy can be restored as soon as possible.

Thank you.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

Mr. Oberstar, you have the last word.

CALL FOR INTERVENTION

Mr. OBERSTAR. I promise I will say it only in English. I want to return to the matter of passenger flights and to urge the administration to take the next step, if it is not willing to cutoff—and there

may be some valid humanitarian reasons for not terminating passenger service—at least be sure that the passenger flights do not carry cargo.

Mr. Chairman, a moment ago you set up a very interesting criterion. At what point has the suffering become so great that we must decide that the policy isn't working, the policy of sanctions. I would say that point has already been reached.

If you measure suffering and poverty by any American criteria, it was reached in September, at the time of the coup. If you measure suffering and misery by Haitian standards, that point has long been passed.

Haitians are a long-suffering people. They know how to survive. Where our worst ghettos, our worst Indian reservations in America turn up their nose, they have survived. They are past the point. Haiti may be in an irreversible decline if we don't act. Don't give the sanctions too much time.

Thank you.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray, thank you very much for your indulgence of the committee's questions today. We wish you every success, recognizing that the only thing that might separate some American family from a phone call that their son or daughter's life has been lost in an invasion of Haiti may be the success of your mission.

With that in mind, we wish you every success in your efforts to help President Aristide return.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, members of this distinguished committee, it is good to come back to this room and to have the opportunity to participate on this side as opposed to that side. It is an interesting perspective, I might add.

Secondly, to let you know that the administration does and will continue to consult with Congress as we move along on this very complex and challenging problem, and to assure all of you that whatever the President does will be consistent with United States and international law on this issue. And we expect to work in a consultive manner with you.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Gray. The President has chosen well.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY III

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

IT IS GOOD TO BE HERE. AS YOU WILL RECALL, MR. CHAIRMAN, I BEGAN MY CAREER IN CONGRESS ON THIS COMMITTEE. THEN, AS TODAY, I WAS FOLLOWING MY MOTHER'S ADMONITION TO KEEP GOOD COMPANY. THUS, I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU TODAY TO WORK WITH OLD COLLEAGUES AND NEW PARTNERS AS WE CONFRONT THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING US IN HAITI.

MR. CHAIRMAN, ON MAY 8TH, PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED A CHANGE IN OUR POLICY ON HAITI. LIKE MANY OF YOU, HE FELT THE CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE OF THE MILITARY JUNTA IN HAITI LEFT US NO CHOICE BUT TO STEP UP OUR EFFORTS TO BRING DOWN HAITI'S DICTATORS AND TO EXTEND EVERY CONSIDERATION TO THOSE FLEEING THEIR OPPRESSIVE RULE.

SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, WE HAVE ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DISTINGUISHED BY THREE CHARACTERISTICS. THEY HAVE MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION. THEY ARE TOUGH ON THE DE FACTO REGIME AND ITS SUPPORTERS, AND THEY ARE COMPASSIONATE TOWARDS THE REGIME'S VICTIMS. TO APPRECIATE THESE CHARACTERISTICS ONE NEED ONLY REVIEW WHAT'S BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SINCE MAY 8.

PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S NEW POLICY ON SANCTIONS

--ON MAY 21, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917, IMPOSING STRINGENT NEW SANCTIONS ON HAITI, WENT INTO EFFECT.

--ON MAY 26, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MR. DANTE CAPUTO, AND I MET WITH PRESIDENT BALAGUER AND REACHED AGREEMENT ON A PLAN TO SEAL THE BORDER BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI, AND TO SEND 60 INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ADVISERS TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO HELP IN THAT EFFORT.

--ON JUNE 3, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRIENDS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON HAITI, WHICH INCLUDE ARGENTINA, CANADA, FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND VENEZUELA, DECIDED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER ON A NATIONAL BASIS EXPANDED SANCTIONS THAT WOULD CUT OFF COMMERCIAL AIR FLIGHTS TO AND FROM HAITI AND BAN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. THE FRIENDS ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO PROMOTE THE FULL REDEPLOYMENT OF A STRENGTHENED AND RECONFIGURED UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI.

AND ON REFUGEES

--ON MAY 19, THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, MRS. OGATA, AND I WERE PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON A PLAN FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE PROCESSING OF HAITIAN APPLICANTS FOR REFUGEE STATUS, AND IN LOCATING COUNTRIES OF RESETTLEMENT FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES.

--ON JUNE 1, THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAMAICA AND OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED JOINTLY A PLAN FOR SHIPBOARD PROCESSING OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS IN JAMAICAN PORTS.

--ON JUNE 3, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AGREED TO THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR A LAND BASED PROCESSING CENTER ON GRAND TURK ISLAND.

AND ON MULTILATERAL SUPPORT

--ON JUNE 6, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND I ATTENDED THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ON HAITI IN BELEM, BRAZIL. A STRONG RESOLUTION WAS ENACTED WHICH INCLUDES A CALL UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO ASSIST IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF HAITIAN REFUGEES, TO SUPPORT MEASURES BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS POLICE AND MILITARY MISSION IN HAITI, AND TO SUPPORT AND REINFORCE EXISTING AND ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE MILITARY REGIME.

WHILE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, I BELIEVE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE HAITIAN CRISIS. ALLOW ME TO EXPLAIN WHY THESE STEPS ARE IMPORTANT AND HOW THEY FIT INTO THE PRESIDENT'S OVERALL STRATEGY.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN HAITI

PRESIDENT CLINTON IS COMMITTED TO THE PROMPT RETURN OF DEMOCRACY AND OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE TO HAITI.

WHY ARE WE SO COMMITTED TO THIS TASK? WHY DOES HAITI MATTER THIS MUCH TO THE UNITED STATES? HOW DOES HAITI DIFFER FROM OTHER TROUBLED COUNTRIES AROUND THE GLOBE? PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS RECENTLY EXPLAINED OUR INTERESTS QUITE CLEARLY:

--FIRST, HAITI IS A CLOSE NEIGHBOR.

--SECOND, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION PERSONS OF HAITIAN DESCENT RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

--THIRD, SEVERAL THOUSAND AMERICAN CITIZENS LIVE IN HAITI.

--FOURTH, WE BELIEVE DRUGS ARE COMING TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HAITI.

--FIFTH, WE FACE THE CONTINUOUS POSSIBILITY OF A MASSIVE OUTFLOW OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF CONDITIONS IN HAITI.

--FINALLY, HAITI AND CUBA ARE THE ONLY TWO NON-DEMOCRACIES LEFT IN OUR HEMISPHERE, AND IN HAITI THE RESULTS OF A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION WERE OVERTURNED BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MEANS.

THESE POINTS BEAR DISCUSSION IN GREATER DEPTH. OBVIOUSLY, WE HAVE A MORAL STAKE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS VARIES. WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RIGHT EVERY WRONG, EVERYWHERE, EVERY TIME. BUT THIS IS NOT A VALID ARGUMENT AGAINST TAKING ACTION IN PLACES WHERE ARE INTERESTS ARE HEAVILY ENGAGED AND AT TIMES WHERE AND WHEN WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO DO SO. INDEED, THERE ARE TIMES WHEN THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION GIVES US THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO. THIS IS ONE OF THOSE TIMES.

HAITI IS A PLACE WHERE WE HAVE NOT ONLY A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, BUT A VERY PRACTICAL INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. THE CORRUPT AND BRUTAL BEHAVIOR OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP TOWARD THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND SOCIETY HAS CAUSED HAITIANS TO TRY TO LEAVE THEIR HOMELAND TO SEEK A DECENT LIFE ELSEWHERE--SOME BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTLY TARGETED BY THE MILITARY, MANY MORE BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL DESOLATION THE MILITARY'S CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT

HAS INFILCTED ON THE COUNTRY. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND CULTURAL TIES, THE VAST MAJORITY OF THOSE SEEKING A NEW LIFE ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES. AS WE LEARNED OVER A DECADE AGO WITH THE MARIEL BOAT LIFT FROM CUBA, THE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR OWN SOCIETY OF A SUDDEN, MASS INFILUX OF ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE DEVASTATING. BUT NEITHER CAN WE ACCEPT INDEFINITELY THAT THE BURDEN OF CORRUPTION AND BRUTALITY BE BORNE BY THE PEOPLE OF HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES RATHER THAN BY THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT.

OUR SECOND SET OF INTERESTS IS LESS DIRECT BUT NO LESS IMPORTANT. THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY AS THE PREVAILING FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THIS HEMISPHERE IS CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY IN OUR SELF-INTEREST. DEMOCRACIES GENERATE HOPE; DICTATORSHIPS PRODUCE REFUGEES. DEMOCRACIES WORK WITH EACH OTHER TO CREATE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE; DICTATORSHIPS ENGAGE IN CORRUPTION AND THEN CREATE CONFLICTS TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THEIR PEOPLE. DEMOCRACIES TEND TOWARD POLITICAL STABILITY SINCE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES CAN CORRECT THEIR MISTAKES AT THE BALLOT BOX; DICTATORSHIPS FREQUENTLY CHANGE COURSE ONLY AT THE POINT OF A GUN.

A MULTILATERAL STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING UNITED STATES INTERESTS

GIVEN OUR CLEAR INTERESTS IN ENDING THE CRISIS IN HAITI, THE PRESIDENT ADOPTED LAST MONTH A THREE PART POLICY TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS HE HAS ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. FIRST AND FOREMOST, OUR POLICY IS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT THE PROMPT DEPARTURE FROM POWER OF THE CURRENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN HAITI. THEY ALONE HAVE CREATED THE PROBLEM. THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION UNTIL THEY DEPART. SECOND, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. THIRD, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN A SERIES OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MITIGATE HUMAN SUFFERING TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE EVEN AS WE WORK TO BRING A DEFINITIVE END TO THE SITUATION THAT HAS SPAWNED IT. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT IN ADOPTING THIS POLICY, THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE IS DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD ACT ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS. EACH OF THESE THREE ELEMENTS OF POLICY ARE BEING PURSUED IN FULL COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE DEPARTURE OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY LEADERS

OUR RECENT POLICY REVIEW CONFIRMED THAT THE REAL OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF A MILITARY LEADERSHIP THAT HAS VIOLATED HAITI'S OWN CONSTITUTION, VIOLATED ITS OWN INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND VIOLATED THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS OWN COUNTRYMEN. THESE COUP LEADERS HAD THEIR CHANCE TO CORRECT THE ERROR OF THEIR PAST WAYS AND TO SAVE THEMSELVES, THEIR INSTITUTION AND THEIR COUNTRY. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY HAVE NO CONCERN WHATSOEVER FOR THEIR FELLOW SOLDIERS OR THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS. THEY MUST GO.

ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO FOCUS PRESSURE ON THESE COUP LEADERS. THE UNITED STATES TOOK THE LEAD IN THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS ON HAITI. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917 DIRECTLY LINKS THE SANCTIONS AGAINST HAITI TO THE RETIREMENT OF GENERAL CEDRAS AND THE DEPARTURE FROM HAITI OF GENERAL BIAMBY AND LT. COLONEL FRANCOIS. IN ADDITION TO THE WORLDWIDE EMBARGO OF ARMS AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND THE FREEZING OF THE ILLEGAL REGIME'S ASSETS ALREADY IN PLACE, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917 IMPOSES A COMPREHENSIVE TRADE EMBARGO (EXEMPTING ONLY FOOD AND MEDICINE), A CUT OFF OF ALL BUT REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER AIR SERVICE, A PROHIBITION AGAINST TRAVEL WORLDWIDE OF THE HAITIAN OFFICER CORPS, MEMBERS OF THE PUPPET CIVILIAN REGIME, AND OTHERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MILITARY COUP, AND CALLS FOR A FREEZING OF THE PERSONAL ASSETS OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS. THE RESOLUTION MAKES CLEAR THAT ALL OF THESE SANCTIONS WILL STAY IN PLACE UNTIL THESE THREE GO. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DEPARTURE OF THESE THREE AND THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW LEADERSHIP COMMITTED TO CARRYING OUT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTION UNDER THE GOVERNORS ISLAND ACCORD WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF LIFTING THE SANCTIONS.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: THE KEY TO SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT

SECOND, SANCTIONS ARE ONLY AS GOOD AS THEIR ENFORCEMENT. A WORLDWIDE FUEL EMBARGO WAS RE-IMPOSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS LAST FALL. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LEADERSHIP WAS CRUCIAL NOT ONLY IN SECURING THIS PROMPT RESPONSE TO THE MILITARY'S BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GOVERNORS ISLAND AGREEMENT, BUT IN ESTABLISHING A MULTINATIONAL MARITIME ENFORCEMENT EFFORT TO ENSURE IT WAS RESPECTED. THE UNITED STATES HAS MAINTAINED BOTH NAVAL AND COAST GUARD VESSELS AROUND HAITI TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO, AND WE HAVE BEEN JOINED BY NAVAL VESSELS FROM FRANCE, CANADA, ARGENTINA AND THE NETHERLANDS. THESE EFFORTS HAVE HAD A TREMENDOUS EFFECT ON THE HAITIAN ECONOMY. WE ESTIMATED THAT BETWEEN 65 AND 70 PERCENT OF HAITI'S NORMAL PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT BEING MET. THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ROSE AS HIGH AS \$10 PER GALLON. ELECTRICITY WAS AVAILABLE IN THE CAPITAL FOR ONLY A FEW HOURS A DAY. SCORES OF BUSINESSES HAVE SHUT DOWN OR ARE OPERATING AT MINIMAL CAPACITY.

BUT WE ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH EVEN THIS LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS. EVERY GALLON OF FUEL THAT LEAKS THROUGH THE EMBARGO ALLOWS THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO PUT OFF THE DECISION THEY MUST ULTIMATELY TAKE, AND THUS SIMPLY PROLONGS THE AGONY FOR THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.

A KEY TO IMPROVING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO IS THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT FACES A SIGNIFICANT TASK IN ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT SMUGGLING OVER A 175 MILE LONG LAND BORDER AND EXTENSIVE COASTAL SEA ROUTES. THE BETTER THE ENFORCEMENT, THE HIGHER THE PROFIT MARGIN FOR SMUGGLERS, AND HENCE THE INCENTIVE TO TAKE RISKS. SO IT IS NOT AN EASY JOB.

TO REINVIGORATE OUR EFFORTS TO FACILITATE THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MR. DANTE CAPUTO, AND I VISITED PRESIDENT BALAGUER LAST MONTH. PRESIDENT BALAGUER DESCRIBED TO US THE EFFORTS HIS GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING, AND COMMITTED HIMSELF PERSONALLY TO ASSURE THAT THE BORDER WAS SEALED. HE LIKEWISE UNDERTOOK TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF A UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL TEAM THAT HAS COMPLETED ITS ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

A JUNE 1 FOLLOW-UP VISIT BY MR. CAPUTO CONFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT BALAGUER AND THE DOMINICAN MILITARY ARE WORKING TO PUT INTO PRACTICE THE MEASURES RECOMMENDED. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO ASSIST THEM IN DOING SO.

IN SUM, WE FOUND PRESIDENT BALAGUER AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO BE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND FULLY PREPARED TO MEET THEM. WE ARE ALREADY SEEING ENCOURAGING RESULTS ON THE BORDER.

LET ME TAKE THIS OCCASION TO DENY CATEGORICALLY SPECULATION IN THE PRESS THAT THE COOPERATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WAS SOMEHOW LINKED TO OUR POSITION ON THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN THAT NATION. PRESIDENT BALAGUER HAD INITIATED COOPERATION WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE ELECTIONS (FOR EXAMPLE IN INVITING THE U.N. TEAM) AND HAS NEVER CONNECTED THE TWO ISSUES IN ANY OF HIS TALKS WITH US, NOR HAVE WE WITH HIM. THE U.S. POSITIONS ON THESE TWO MATTERS ARE BASED ON THE MERITS OF EACH. ON THE ELECTIONS, WE HAVE LAID OUT OUR CONCERNs PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS. WE WILL NOT PURSUE DEMOCRACY IN HAITI AT THE EXPENSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

FURTHER SANCTIONS IN THE OFFING

EVEN AS THE NEW SANCTIONS AND NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS WE HAVE ALREADY PUT INTO EFFECT BEGIN TO BITE, WE ARE DEVELOPING NEW MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. AT A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRIENDS OF THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ON HAITI (UNITED STATES, FRANCE, CANADA, VENEZUELA, AND ARGENTINA) HELD JUNE 3, WE TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING CONSIDERATION OF A CUT-OFF OF COMMERCIAL AIR SERVICE AND OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH HAITI. THE FRIENDS EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO CONSIDER SUCH MEASURES AND ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO DO SO. THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ON HAITI YESTERDAY PASSED A RESOLUTION URGING ALL STATES TO CONSIDER APPLYING THESE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT OTHERS ARE READY TO JOIN US IN PREPARING TO MOVE TOWARD THESE ADDITIONAL MEASURES.

RECONSTITUTING THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

A RECONFIGURED UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION FOR HAITI WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSURING THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN HAITI.

WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD AGREE TO RECONSTITUTE AND RECONFIGURE THE UN MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH).

A UNSC DECISION TO RECONSTITUTE UNMIH WILL SEND AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DETERMINATION TO THE MILITARY REGIME IN PORT AU PRINCE, AND AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE OF REASSURANCE TO THE HAITIAN POPULATION.

UNMIH SHOULD BE READY TO DEPLOY, ONCE THE CURRENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN HAITI HAS DEPARTED. WE ENVISAGE THIS AS A PERMISSIVE OPERATION. THE MISSION SHOULD HAVE A MANDATE AND A COMPOSITION, HOWEVER, WHICH WILL PERMIT IT TO DEAL WITH SUCH CHALLENGES AS IT IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER IN THE COURSE OF ITS DEPLOYMENT.

WE BELIEVE THAT IN ADDITION TO RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE ARMY AND POLICE, UNMIH SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN THE MANDATE, AND THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF HAITI IN PROVIDING SECURITY TO THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, SENIOR HAITIAN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL, AND KEY INSTALLATIONS, AND HELPING ASSURE BASIC CIVIC ORDER.

WE WILL ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM MULTINATIONAL PARTICIPATION. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A MISSION.

WE HAVE RECEIVED SUPPORT FOR A UN MISSION FOR HAITI RECONSTITUTED AND STRENGTHENED ALONG THESE LINES FROM THE "FRIENDS OF HAITI" LAST FRIDAY, AND AT THE OAS MINISTERIAL THIS WEEK. AT THAT MEETING IN BRAZIL, PRESIDENT ARISTIDE CALLED FOR SUCH CHANGES IN UNMIH'S COMPOSITION AND MANDATE. YESTERDAY IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE IN HAITI, THE HEMISPHERIC MINISTERS LENT THEIR WEIGHT TO THIS CALL. IN THE COMING DAYS WE WILL BE WORKING WITH THE UN AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS TO SECURE A STRENGTHENED AND RECONSTITUTED MANDATE FOR UNMIH, AND TO ENCOURAGE BROAD MULTINATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN IT.

RADIO BROADCASTING TO HAITI

FINALLY, I WOULD NOTE THAT PRESIDENT ARISTIDE HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP WE ALL SEEK. HE HAS TOLD ME THAT HE DOES NOT CONSIDER THE ACCESS HE NOW HAS TO THE HAITIAN MEDIA TO BE ADEQUATE TO ALLOW HIM TO CARRY HIS MESSAGE OF RECONCILIATION AND PROGRESS TO THE HAITIAN PEOPLE. WE ARE CONSIDERING WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN FURTHER ASSIST HIM TO BRING HIS MESSAGE OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION DIRECTLY TO THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.

DUE PROCESS FOR HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS

AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVIEW OF ITS POLICY TOWARDS HAITI WAS THE TREATMENT OF HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED ON MAY 8 THAT CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS TO UNITED STATES' REFUGEE POLICY TOWARDS HAITI WOULD BE MADE. SPECIFICALLY, HE STATED THAT WHILE ALL HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INTERDICITED AT SEA, A DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE STATUS WOULD BE MADE FOR THOSE REQUESTING ASYLUM PRIOR TO ANY REPATRIATION. THOSE PERSONS FOUND TO BE REFUGEES WILL BE PROVIDED REFUGE. THOSE WHO ARE NOT FOUND TO BE REFUGEES WILL BE RETURNED TO HAITI.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN PROCESSING

WE ARE NOW NEARING THE TIME WHEN WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO IMPLEMENT THESE CHANGES. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE TALBOTT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA ON JUNE 2 PERMITTING THE UNITED STATES TO PROCESS HAITIANS ABOARD VESSELS IN JAMAICA'S TERRITORIAL WATERS. THESE VESSELS ARE CURRENTLY EN ROUTE TO JAMAICA, AND WE ANTICIPATE THAT REFUGEE PROCESSING WILL BE ABLE TO COMMENCE SOON.

WE HAVE ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS TO USE GRAND TURK ISLAND AS AN ON SHORE PROCESSING LOCATION. WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE HAITIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM IS BEING ADDRESSED IN A MULTILATERAL FASHION AS IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM.

WE ARE ALSO EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION THAT WE ARE RECEIVING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR). UNHCR HAS AGREED TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE REFUGEE PROCESSING OPERATION BY COUNSELLING HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE PRIOR TO THEIR REFUGEE INTERVIEWS, PROVIDING GUIDANCE AND TRAINING TO THE INTERVIEWING OFFICERS, AND MONITORING THE OVERALL PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT IT MEETS THE HIGHEST STANDARDS FOR REFUGEE DETERMINATION.

SHARING THE REFUGEE BURDEN INTERNATIONALLY

IN ADDITION TO COOPERATION IN PROCESSING, UNHCR HAS INDICATED IT WILL ASSIST THE U.S. IN IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES WILLING TO ACCEPT APPROVED HAITIAN REFUGEES EITHER FOR TEMPORARY PROTECTION OR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE APPROACHED STATES IN THE REGION, AND REQUESTED THAT THEY ACCEPT APPROVED HAITIAN REFUGEES EITHER TEMPORARILY OR PERMANENTLY. WE HAVE RECEIVED DEFINITIVE POSITIVE RESPONSES FROM A FEW AND ENCOURAGING ONES FROM A NUMBER OF OTHERS. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE COUNTRIES TO TAKE THEIR FAIR SHARE. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN HAITI IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WE HOPE THAT IT WILL ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN ITS RESOLUTION.

MONITORING RETURNEES

WHILE SOME HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE WILL BE FOUND TO BE REFUGEES, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE MAJORITY WILL NOT BE APPROVED AND WILL BE RETURNED TO HAITI. OUR EXPERIENCE THUS FAR INDICATES THAT REPATRIATED BOAT PEOPLE ARE NOT TARGETED FOR RETRIBUTION BY HAITIAN AUTHORITIES; HOWEVER, AS HAS BEEN DONE FOR OVER TWO YEARS, OUR EMBASSY IN PORT-AU-PRINCE WILL ENDEAVOR TO MONITOR THE WELFARE OF THOSE WHO ARE REPATRIATED.

IN-COUNTRY PROCESSING IS SAFEST

AS THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED, WE BELIEVE OUR IN-COUNTRY REFUGEE PROCESSING PROGRAM REMAINS THE BEST AND SAFEST MEANS FOR GENUINE REFUGEES TO HAVE THEIR CLAIMS HEARD. WE HAVE THREE IN-COUNTRY PROCESSING CENTERS THAT PERMIT PERSONS WITH A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION TO HAVE THEIR CLAIMS ADJUDICATED WITHOUT HAVING TO TAKE A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SEA JOURNEY IN UNSEAWORTHY VESSELS. WE WISH TO URGE THOSE WHO ARE THINKING ABOUT TAKING SUCH A RISK TO CONSIDER APPLYING AT ONE OF THE IN-COUNTRY CENTERS INSTEAD.

SINCE THE IN-COUNTRY REFUGEE PROCESSING PROGRAM BEGAN, OVER 2,500 PERSONS HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES AS REFUGEES. THE ADMISSION OF THESE RECENT REFUGEES, COMBINED WITH NORMAL IMMIGRATION OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS, MAKES HAITI ONE OF THE LARGEST SOURCES OF NEW RESIDENTS TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD, DESPITE ITS RELATIVELY SMALL POPULATION. THAT BEING SAID, OUR GOAL IN HAITI IS TO PUT OUR REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTERS OUT OF BUSINESS AND DECREASE THE PRESSURES THAT CAUSE THE REFUGEE CRISIS, BY RESTORING AND STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY AND REBUILDING THE HAITIAN ECONOMY. UNTIL THESE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED, LARGE SCALE HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS COMING TO THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO CONFRONT US.

ALLEVIATING HUMAN SUFFERING

THE THIRD--BUT BY NO MEANS LAST--COMPONENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY IS THAT OF ALLEVIATING HUMAN SUFFERING. THIS ELEMENT OF OUR POLICY RESONATES MOST FULLY IN AMERICAN HEARTS AND IS MOST BROADLY SUPPORTED IN ALL CORNERS OF THIS COUNTRY. PRESIDENT CLINTON IS DETERMINED THAT THE MOST VULNERABLE GROUPS BE PROTECTED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM THE TIGHTENED EMBARGO. FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE NOT ONLY CONTINUING BUT EXPANDING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SUPPORT TO THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.

HUMAN RIGHTS

WE ARE WORKING TO RAPIDLY RETURN AND AUGMENT THE STAFF OF THE JOINT UNITED NATIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN HAITI. THESE COURAGEOUS INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN COMMENDED TO US BY OUR EMBASSY AS THE ONLY PRACTICAL DETERRENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND THEIR ALLIES. OUR EMBASSY HAS RECOMMENDED AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO BUILD THE NUMBERS BACK UP TO AT LEAST THE LEVEL THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THEIR TEMPORARY WITHDRAWAL LAST FALL, AND WE FULLY SHARE THE EMBASSY'S VIEW. AT THIS POINT, 69 MEMBERS HAVE RETURNED TO HAITI AND ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN KEY LOCATIONS. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IS MEANWHILE RECRUITING MORE OBSERVERS.

THE UNITED STATES ACTIVELY SUPPORTS THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HAITI WITH A VERY SOBERING REPORT. THE UNITED STATES FULLY SHARES THEIR VIEWS ON THE GRAVITY AND HORROR OF THE ABUSES REPORTED. AND WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THEIR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS A LARGE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN HAITI FUNDED BY THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING THAT RESULTS FROM CALLOUS MILITARY AUTHORITARIANISM AND ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT, WHICH HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL EMBARGO. THIS PROGRAM IS OPERATED THROUGH WELL-KNOWN AND VERY EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS CARE, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, ADRA AND THE PAN-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION.

IT CONSISTS OF DAILY FEEDING WITH PL-480 TITLE II FOODS FOR NEARLY A MILLION HAITIAN SCHOOL CHILDREN, PREGNANT AND LACTATING MOTHERS, AND ELDERLY HAITIANS.. WE ALSO PROVIDE ACCESS FOR NEARLY 2 MILLION OF THE MOST VULNERABLE HAITIANS TO BASIC HEALTH CARE, SUCH AS CHILD IMMUNIZATIONS, BASIC PHARMACEUTICALS, FAMILY PLANNING, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE, AND LIMITED CURATIVE CARE. FINALLY, WE PROVIDE THROUGH THE PAN-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION 16,000 TEMPORARY JOBS AIMED AT CLEANING UP GARBAGE AND DRAINAGE CANALS, REPAIRING KEY SECONDARY ROADS NEEDED FOR THE FEEDING PROGRAMS, AND REBUILDING IRRIGATION CANALS.

AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MAY 8TH DECISION TO IMPOSE STRONGER SANCTIONS, WE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO EXPANDING THESE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS AS THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ARE FELT. WE HAVE INCREASED ACTUAL FEEDING LEVELS IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS BY 320,000 PEOPLE. WE EXPECT THE JOBS PROGRAM TO PUT FOOD-PURCHASING INCOMES INTO THE POCKETS OF AT LEAST ANOTHER 29,000 POOR HAITIANS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. WE WILL SOON CONTRACT WITH A LOGISTICS FIRM THAT CAN ASSIST OUR VOLUNTARY AGENCIES TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT AND DELIVERY OBSTACLES IN HAITI.

BASIC FOODS AND MEDICINES ARE NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS COMMERCIAL SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, WITH THE RECENTLY STRENGTHENED COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EMBARGO, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE EXTRAORDINARY HUMANITARIAN TRANSPORT OF SUCH ITEMS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. I ASSURE YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE GROUPS IN HAITI.

CONCLUSION

MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME BE AS CLEAR AS I CAN BE. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS DETERMINED THAT OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN HAITI, AND THE RETURN OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE. WE ARE EMBARKED ON A NEW PATH TOWARD THIS GOAL. MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE PRESIDENT CLINTON'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON MAY 8. FURTHER STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. NO OPTION IS EXCLUDED. DEMOCRACY IN HAITI WILL PREVAIL. NEITHER WE, NOR THE HAITIAN PEOPLE CAN LONG WAIT FOR THIS EVENT.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS

Mr. Chairman, I am extremely pleased that you have called this hearing today to discuss the current situation in Haiti. I welcome President Clinton's appointment of the Honorable William Gray to be his Special Envoy, but let nobody assume that his appointment will lead to my easing up on this Administration's policy. I will not. I have in the past said that our policy, or lack of, is an outrage, and I will continue to do so until this government has taken some concrete steps to resolve this situation.

I find myself in a particularly difficult position, as a humanitarian, as an African-American, and as a Member of Congress from South Florida. As a humanitarian and African-American, I say the average Haitian is being tortured, brutalized, and we must stop it, either by removing the perpetrators or helping the victims escape. But as a South Floridian I say stop. We can't handle anymore people. Our local social, health and educational services cannot support the influx.

So what is the answer to my competing selves? The answer is do whatever we can to keep them safe - in their own country.

APPENDIX 1

Questions for the Record Submitted to Deputy Secretary Talbott
House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 28, 1994

Question:

What is the policy today for achieving the restoration of President Aristide?

Answer:

- Acting multilaterally, we have imposed tougher sanctions through the UN Security Council. Our Navy is redoubling its efforts off the coast of Haiti to intercept ships violating the embargo. On May 25, Special Advisor Gray travelled to the Dominican Republic and received a commitment from Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer to seal the border with Haiti. We are also considering additional measures which will intensify the pressure on the illegal regime. We believe such steps will convince the Haitian military to relinquish power.

- We are ruling other options neither in nor out.

Question:

What is different with respect to U.S. objectives compared to what they were six months ago?

Answer:

- Our objectives have not changed. The Administration continues to be firmly committed to restoring democracy and returning President Aristide to Haiti through a broadly supported multilateral effort. The military leadership who usurped power from the people must be removed from power. All our actions are designed to bring about this result.

Question:

What is different with respect to U.S. policy toward the Haitian regime?

Answer:

- The policy toward the illegal regime remains unchanged. We do not recognize the "Provisional President," Emile Jonassaint's claim of legitimacy, nor do we recognize the military leadership that supports his bogus regime.
- We recognize President Aristide as the legitimate head of the Haitian state, and those officials he has named, such as acting Prime Minister Robert Malval, who now function in an "acting" capacity.

Question:

What is different with respect to tactics?

Answer:

- We have imposed tougher sanctions through the UN and our Navy is redoubling its efforts off the coast of Haiti to intercept ships violating the embargo. On May 25, Special Advisor Gray travelled to the Dominican Republic and received a commitment from Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer to seal the border with Haiti. We believe that steps such as these will enhance the effectiveness of the international sanctions and will convince the Haitian military to relinquish power.
- We are also considering additional measures which will intensify the pressure on the illegal regime.
- The sanctions which had been in place had not produced the desired result. As a result of our recent policy review, the President decided on pursuing a six-point framework to attempt to achieve our objectives:
- We have pressed for and achieved a resolution at the UN for comprehensive sanctions that will bar all trade with Haiti except for food, medicine and very

limited other humanitarian exceptions. This will universalize and make mandatory the voluntary sanctions adopted by the OAS. We will also end the exemption for assembly plants.

- We also received UN Security Council approval to multilateralize and make mandatory our current targetted sanctions against those most responsible for maintaining the military dictatorship.
- We are working closely with the Government of the Dominican Republic and the UN to reduce the illegal flow of fuel across the border into Haiti. The Dominican Republic has asked the UN for assistance to further strengthen enforcement of the oil embargo. During the week of May 23, a UN survey team visited the Dominican Republic. The team will make recommendations to the government of the Dominican Republic on stopping the illegal flow of fuel. On May 26, President Balaguer promised Mr. Gray that he would implement fully the team's recommendations.
- We will be augmenting our humanitarian assistance to Haiti's poor to mitigate the impact of increased

sanctions. Specifically, we expect to increase the level of food beneficiaries, to augment the supply of basic health services to vulnerable groups, and to provide more short-term jobs aimed at repairing roads needed to deliver humanitarian goods.

- We are exploring ways to reconfigure the UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti, temporarily abandoned in October 1993 by our decision to withdraw the USS Harlan County from Haiti) to make it more effective.
- We are working for the dispatch of more UN/OAS human rights observers to Haiti, which we have consistently supported. After an absence of three months, the ICM with our strong encouragement returned in January and now has sixty-nine monitors in Port-au-Prince. We have contributed \$16 million and have a further \$13 million appropriated in FY 1994.
- Our policy puts the onus directly on the military leaders who are responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy. It seeks to protect innocent Haitians while increasing the pressure on those in Haiti who are responsible. The new sanctions are not conditioned on any action by President Aristide, who is clearly the injured party.

Question:

What is different with respect to U.S. policy toward President Aristide?

Answer:

- Our objectives have not changed. The Administration continues to be firmly committed to restoring democracy and returning President Aristide to Haiti. The military authorities who have usurped power from the people must yield. All our actions are designed to bring this about.

- We recognize President Aristide as the legitimate head of the Haitian state, and those officials he has named, like acting Prime Minister Robert Malval, who now function in an "acting" capacity.

Question:

What is your scenario with respect to how this policy will lead to Aristide's return?

Answer:

- We believe increased pressure on the illegal regime will result in the removal of those responsible for President Aristide's overthrow in the near future.

- If they do not leave, President Clinton has made clear that he will not rule out more drastic measures.

Question:

What new policy initiatives are under consideration and does the Administration have an overall framework devised for the return of President Aristide?

Answer:

- We believe our increased pressure on the illegal regime will result in the removal of those responsible for President Aristide's overthrow in the near future.
- If they do not leave, President Clinton has said that he will not rule out more drastic steps.
- We believe that the Governors Island process should be resumed once those responsible for the initial breakdown of that process are removed from power.
- Since my testimony on April 28, and in light of the worsening human rights situation the President decided on May 7 to modify our procedures regarding Haitian asylum seekers to assure due process.
- President Clinton has decided that we will continue to interdict all Haitian migrants at sea, but we will determine -- aboard ship or in other countries -- which

Haitians are genuine political refugees. Those who are not found to have genuine claims will be returned. Those who do have genuine claims will be provided refuge.

- Many people share our concern about how the Hemisphere will respond to potential outflows of Haitian refugees. We hope that we can work cooperatively with nations in the region and with the UNHCR to accord fair processing to those in need and to manage effectively this problem.

Question:

While we are trying to figure out what to do, how many babies are dying because of sanctions?

Answer:

- We deeply share your concern for Haiti's most vulnerable population. Due to the economic mismanagement and corruption of the Haitian military and its allies since the September 1991 coup, Haiti's long-suffering poor continue to suffer. USAID's ongoing humanitarian assistance program in Haiti provides an important means for mitigating the impact of deteriorating economic conditions on Haiti's poor.
- Since 1991, USAID has had in place a monitoring system which collects reliable trend information on pre-school children nutrition levels. USAID uses this data and other more qualitative indicators to identify areas of the country where nutrition rates indicate that increased feeding should be specially targeted. Partly as a result of USAID and other donor feeding programs, nutrition levels for Haitian children have not significantly deteriorated since the 1991 coup (particularly in terms of the most severe malnutrition data.)

- Presently, USAID-sponsored feeding programs, implemented through CARE, ADRA and the Catholic Relief Services are providing direct daily feeding to almost 900,000 children, women and elderly Haitians. Additionally, almost two million Haitians (nearly one-third of the population) are provided access to basic health services financed by the U.S. Three-hundred thousand children under the age of five are receiving child survival services such as vaccinations, nutritional surveillance, oral rehydration therapy and the treatment of acute respiratory infections. These programs are implemented in cooperation with international institutions such as PAHO and with U.S. and Haitian non-governmental organizations.
- Ultimately, the only hope for alleviating the condition of Haiti's poor is a return to democracy.

Question:

The Governors Island Accord was breached by the military at step five; where is the Governors Island Accord as a policy tool to return President Aristide today?

Answer:

- We believe that the Governors Island process should be resumed once those responsible for the initial breakdown of that process are removed from power.
- We believe our increased pressure on the illegal regime will result in the removal of those responsible for President Aristide's overthrow in the near future.
- If they do not, President Clinton has said that he will not rule out more drastic steps.

Question:

With the current U.S. policy, what is our timetable for the return of President Aristide?

Answer:

- Ultimately the choice of when to return belongs to President Aristide.
- We believe increased pressure on the illegal regime will result in the removal of those responsible for President Aristide's overthrow in the near future.

APPENDIX 2

Questions for the Record Submitted to William H. Gray III
House Foreign Affairs Committee
June 8, 1994

Q. Did you discuss the issue of electoral fraud in your recent meetings with President Balaguer?

A. No. My job is Haiti, and I did not wish to imply any linkage between the two issues by engaging in a discussion on the election topic. Our request for Dominican assistance in enforcing the Haiti embargo is not connected to our continued support for free elections in the Dominican Republic. Our requests for assistance on the embargo pre-date the election, and our support for free and fair elections is a constant of our support for democracy which pre-dates the embargo. I will continue discussing Haiti issues with President Balaguer. The U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary Watson will pursue the election issue vigorously.

Q. If not, is it possible that President Balaguer might have interpreted your silence to imply U.S. willingness to make the election issue secondary to sanctions enforcement against the Haitian military?

A. No. To the contrary, by not linking the two subjects we have made it clear that each is of major importance to us and must be addressed on its own merits. We have made very clear in public statements and in private diplomatic contacts with Dominican officials and political leaders our support for free and fair elections. This includes statements issued by the Department of State on May 9, May 16 and June 15. As those statements indicate, we have urged a full investigation of all electoral irregularities. In particular we have urged release of voter lists used at polling stations on election day to allow investigators and party representatives to address charges of disenfranchisement of large numbers of voters who appeared at the polls. We believe the U.S. position has been clearly understood by Dominican authorities and they are listening carefully to what we are saying.

Q. Has Ambassador Pastorino raised the election issue with President Balaguer? How recently?

A. Ambassador Pastorino has discussed the election with President Balaguer on several occasions, most recently at his last meeting with the President prior to his departure from Santo Domingo on June 28.

- Q. What message is Ambassador Pastorino communicating to the Dominican government with respect to alleged election fraud.
- A. Ambassador Pastorino has told the Dominican government that we take seriously the findings by delegations from the Organization of American States, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the National Democratic Institute that irregularities occurred in the May 16 election and that we join the international observers in calling for a full investigation. The Ambassador has urged that the Central Electoral Board look into all irregularities and take the necessary steps to ensure the results of the election are determined in a free and fair manner. The Ambassador has also appealed to all parties to exercise restraint and resolve these issues through legal means.
- Q. What measures is the embassy taking to follow the investigation of election fraud?
- A. The Ambassador and his staff at Embassy Santo Domingo have followed the election closely and are continuing to do so. They are in close contact with members of the Central Electoral Board (JCE) and the investigating commission established to address charges of electoral irregularities, with international observer missions who have extended their stay in the Dominican Republic to follow developments, and with members of Dr. Pena Gomez' Dominican Revolutionary Party as well as Dr. Balaguer's Christian Reformist Party.

Q. How firm is President Balaguer's commitment to close down the Dominican Republic border with Haiti?

A. Although President Balaguer has in the past expressed reservations about the embargo, when Dante Caputo, the Special Representative of the Secretaries General of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, and I met with the President he committed himself to assuring that the border was in his terms "sealed." He likewise undertook to implement fully the recommendations of a United Nations technical team that has completed its assessment of sanctions enforcement measures.

Q. Do you think Balaguer will back away from sanctions enforcement if we push the election issue, or once the election issue is resolved?

A. President Balaguer initiated cooperation on sanctions well in advance of the elections (for example in inviting the U.N. team) and has never connected the two issues in any of his talks with us. Nor have we with him. President Balaguer and his government are fully conscious of their obligations on both issues and we expect them to meet those obligations.

- Q. What guarantees do we have, if any, that President Balaguer will not once again loosen sanctions enforcement efforts once the election results are finalized and recognized by the U.S.?
- A. At our meeting last month President Balaguer assured me he was committed to "sealing" the border and keeping it sealed. We are already seeing a very encouraging increase in enforcement activity from his actions. The best "guarantee" is self interest. At this stage, the Dominican Republic has a very strong interest in bringing about a prompt resolution of the Haiti crisis that coincides with our own. They realize that any easing of enforcement efforts will only prolong the crisis.
- Q. What contact have you had with Acting-Prime Minister Malval and what role do you believe Malval can play? Has the U.S. Government received any requests from Prime Minister Malval for financial assistance for the de jure government in Haiti? Has the U.S. Government provided any material support to Prime Minister Malval and his ministers?
- A. Ambassador Swing at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince is in regular contact with Prime Minister Malval. We continue to admire the role he is playing as a visible reminder in Haiti of legitimacy and democracy. We have discussed with President Aristide how the U.S. might support his de jure ministers, and are awaiting a response.

- Q. What must happen before sanctions are lifted? Will they be lifted in phases or all at once? Is a solution to this crisis possible with General Cedras and Col. Francois remaining in the country? If Cedras and Francois were to step down, are the rank and file of the Haitian military sufficiently professional to follow the leadership of others who may allow the return of President Aristide? What, if any, contact have you had with the Haitian military leadership? Have you contemplated using a senior military person from a third country (such as France) to initiate direct contact with Gen. Cedras and Col. Francois and explore conditions for their departure?
- A. As specified in Resolution 917, for the sanctions to be lifted, Generals Cedras and Biamby and Lt. Col. Francois must depart Haiti. They will not be lifted either whole or in part before that time. The members of the armed forces could save their institution and their country by following a leadership committed to honoring the military's obligations. The United Nations is exploring a strengthened United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to help maintain security after the departure of the military leaders. We do not have regular contact with the military leadership, but they are fully aware of the international community's position. We have not considered using military personnel from third countries to initiate contact with Cedras.

- Q. Could you provide for the record, the facts surrounding the issuance in error of an immigrant visa to the military officer, despite the fact that he was on the State Department's consular lookout list in Port au Prince.
- A. The Department has been aware of the fact that on March 9, the American Embassy in Port au Prince issued an immigrant visa to Yvon Jean-Jacques, an officer in the Haitian military, who had been found to fall within the purview of Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act by authority of the Presidential Proclamation of June 3, 1993. The American Embassy reports that it has the original computer print-out showing that appropriate namechecks of the Consular Lookout System (CLS) had been performed and that the results were negative. The Department of State has the original print-out showing that Capt. Jean-Jacques was properly entered into the CLS on January 14, 1994. Subsequent tests have always resulted in Capt. Jean-Jacques's name being returned by the CLS

We are continuing to review the complete namecheck system in an attempt to explain this incident.

Q. What is the process for Haitian refugees seeking processing to reach Kingston or the Turks and Caicos? Does the Coast Guard shuttle them?

A. Haitian migrants who are interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard are being transferred to the refugee processing site on the USNS Comfort which is stationed in Kingston harbor in Jamaica. Once a processing facility is established in the Turks and Caicos Islands, Haitian boat people will be transported there as well for adjudication of refugee claims.

Those persons found to be refugees will be brought to the U.S. or referred to third countries for resettlement or temporary refuge; those determined not to be refugees will be repatriated to Haiti by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Q. What is the capacity of each of the processing centers?

A. 500 persons per day is the total capacity planned for the region.

Q. How will the 90-95% of those who are not deemed to be political refugees return to Haiti? If they are not returned to Haiti, where do they go?

A. We are not making any presumptions as to the percentage of interdicted migrants that will be found to be refugees.

Those Haitians determined not to be refugees will be repatriated to Haiti by U.S. Coast Guard vessels.

- Q. Has there been or will there be any change in the qualifications for granting political refugee status?
- A. Any Haitian boat person wishing to have a refugee interview will receive one.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will use the same standard for determining refugee status in this program that is used around the world; i.e., persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

- Q. Where do those granted asylum go? How do they get there? What happens to them when they get there?
- A. Those persons approved for refugee status will be transferred (normally by air) by the Department of Defense to Guantanamo Naval Base for further processing.

Once there, those bound for the U.S. will go through expedited post-adjudication processing. UNHCR will assist in referring some cases to other resettlement countries.

U.S.-bound refugees will undergo normal but expedited post-approval processing such as medical exams (currently while on board the hospital ship USNS Comfort), sponsorship assurances and onward travel arrangements.

Medical screening consists of obtaining a verbal history, conducting a brief physical exam focusing on statutorily excludable conditions, including a chest x-ray and blood test for venereal disease and HIV. DOD doctors will conduct the exams with supervision of the process by the Public Health Service. Each approved refugee bound for the U.S. will be assigned a sponsoring voluntary agency to assist in initial resettlement. Once the medical exam and sponsorship assurance have been completed, the approved refugees will be transported to the U.S. and resettled in communities throughout the U.S.

We are waiting for responses from a number of countries to our request that they accept Haitian refugees temporarily or permanently. We hope that with the active support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) other countries will respond positively to our request for assistance.

- Q. Are the sanctions working? How long do you anticipate Cedras et.al. will hold out? Is there a cut-off date, a "leave or else" deadline involved?
- A. Yes, the sanctions are having an effect. Comprehensive international sanctions were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 917 only about one month ago. We are seeing efforts by individuals within Haiti to convince the coup leaders that they should step down in order to stop the pain and suffering they are imposing on the Haitian people, including the other members of the armed forces. We have set no deadline, but we have also indicated that other options are open.
- Q. Are there any efforts, direct or indirect, to negotiate a step-down by Cedras et al.? If so, what are the inducements offered? What are the threats involved? Are there relocation and support offers?
- A. The UN Security Council has made clear that General Cedras must retire and General Biamby and Lt. Col. Francois must leave Haiti as specified in Resolution 917. Only when this occurs will sanctions begin to be lifted. Sanctions are beginning to have effect, and we have seen signs of erosion in support for the coup leaders.
- Q. With all the media speculation about an OAS (or multinational) force invasion, have you been actively promoting invasion plans or policy in your talks with Caribbean leaders? Is the administration willfully ignoring the sense of the Congress rejecting U.S. military intervention in Haiti?
- A. President Clinton has made clear that we cannot rule out the use of force. To do so would only give encouragement to the military leaders now holding Haiti hostage. Our focus now, however, is on a strong multilateral sanctions regime to bring pressure on the military leaders.

Q. What are the costs involved in the Administration's current Haiti policy? of enforcing sanctions? of providing reimbursement to Jamaica and Turks/Caicos? of running processing centers (and cruise ships)? of sustaining Aristide's government-in-exile in D.C.? of humanitarian relief?

A. Enforcing Sanctions: We have seen DOD estimates for the incremental cost of maritime sanctions enforcement for FY 1994 of \$48.3 million. We propose, in addition, to provide assistance to the Dominican Republic for sanctions enforcement on the Haitian/Dominican border. We would expect the costs of equipment which might be provided to the Dominican Republic for this purpose to be between \$12 million and \$15 million.

Jamaica and Turks/Caicos: In connection with bilateral agreements regarding migrant processing facilities, we have agreed, subject to the availability of appropriations, to reimburse Jamaica and Turks/Caicos for the costs they incur directly attributable to this operation and, in the case of Turks/Caicos, for rental of a site for a land-based processing facility. We expect equipment costs for Jamaica in this regard to be about \$1.5 million, and the rental cost in Turks/Caicos to be \$2 million.

Processing Centers/Ships: DOD estimates the acquisition and operations costs for ship-based processing centers to be \$33 million in FY 1994, and construction and operations costs for a land-based center in Turks/Caicos, including infrastructure improvements, to be \$19 million. We estimate the actual processing costs to total about \$10 million.

Aristide's Government: The United States does not pay costs of sustaining the Aristide Government, these expenses are paid for from Haitian Government resources.

Humanitarian Relief: Our humanitarian relief program in Haiti is funded this year at \$56 million.

- Q. In the event of an invasion, is there a guarantee that Aristide would return (assuming the departure of Cedras et al.)?
- A. The goal of our Haiti policy is to restore democracy to Haiti, including the return of President Aristide to Haiti so that he may assume his duties as the duly-elected President of that country.
- Q. Who would provide security for Aristide?
- A. The UN Security Council has proposed that the UN Mission in Haiti should assist the Government of Haiti in protecting Haitian democratic leaders.
- Q. Would U.S. forces be involved in providing for the personal security of Aristide?
- A. The UN Security Council has proposed that the UN Mission in Haiti should assist the Government of Haiti in protecting Haitian democratic leaders.
- Q. In the event of an invasion, what are the planned rules of engagement and disengagement? Is there a timetable? Are there clear rules about the use of deadly force? Besides Cedras and Michel Francois, how many "elitists" have to be neutralized or removed?
- A. We cannot speculate about any hypothetical situation such as this.

- Q. Media reports suggest that there will be no peacekeeping force sent to Haiti until or unless Cedras et al. step down. Is that the understanding?
- A. Yes. We support deployment of UNMIH under appropriate circumstances, when the senior military leadership identified in Resolution 917 (Gen. Cedras, Gen. Biamby and Lt. Col. Francois) have departed.
- Q. Media reports further suggest that a multinational peacekeeping force will not be put in place if U.S. military intervention is used to remove Cedras et al. Is this true?
- A. The U.S. is working and intends to work multilaterally, through the OAS, the UN and our friends in the region. These discussions have also focussed on the reconstituted UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) which, as you will recall, received strong, unanimous support from the OAS general assembly in Belem, Brazil.
- Q. Doesn't this effectively rule out unilateral U.S. military intervention in Haiti?
- A. We have joined with other members of the UN to impose sanctions on Haiti to bring pressure to bear on the current leadership to leave the country and allow the return of the democratically-elected government. As far as other possible elements of our policy are concerned, the President has not explicitly ruled in or out any other options.




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